

FILED ON DEMAND

CAUSE NO. **236 313994 18**

glenn winningham; house of fearn §
a man, Demandant §
vs. §
Timothy C Graham, Euless Police §
Edgar L. Hurtado, Police Supervisor §
Michael R Collingwood, Euless Police §
Michael Brown, Euless Chief of Police §
Lacy Britton, Euless Magistrate §
Stacy White, Coward Prosecutor §
Echols-Kirksey, A, Euless Jailor §
V Nilson, Euless Jailor §
Linda Martin, Euless Mayor §
Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney §
with the rank of general §
Deer Park Cash Cow, LLC §
John Mc Bryde, (bought and paid for) §
Clerk masquerading as a Judge §
Erin Nealy Cox, US Attorney §
Tarrant County Sheriff's Office §
Sharen Wilson, Tarrant County DA §
GLENN WINNINGHAM FEARN, §
cestui que trust §
Wrongdoers §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

FILED
TARRANT COUNTY
2019 DEC 18 P 3:17
THOMAS A. WILDER
DISTRICT CLERK

ORIGINAL PETITION BY DECLARATION

- One. all the facts stated herein are true, correct, complete, are not hearsay, are not misleading, but are admissible as evidence, if not rebutted and proven inaccurate, and if testifying, i shall so state;
- Two. The Demandant has standing capacity to act as to the lawful matters herein;
- Three. The Demandant is a man on the soil of Texas, on turtle island;
- Four. in absence of contrary evidence the Demandant is a free man on the soil of Texas and other American states from time to time, and devoid of any knowledge of surrendering or volunteering himself to the armed forces of any country and hold any respondents to the strictest proof to the contrary;
- Five. The Demandant has personal, executive, and documented knowledge of the facts and evidence contained herein and if called to testify shall so state;
- Six. The Demandant witnessed that the citation of state and federal statutes, codes, rules, regulations, and court citations, within any document created by me, is only to notice the Demandant's servants that which is applicable to them and is not intended,

nor shall it be construed, to mean that i confer, submit to, or have entered into any jurisdiction alluded to thereby;

Seven. The Demandant has no firsthand knowledge of a date of birth, and the Demandant's mother, and the doctor who assisted with it are now dead, and the Demandant failed to cross examine them to determine the veracity of their information, therefore any evidence of a date of birth is hearsay evidence, and inadmissible as evidence in any court of law, but the Demandant does remember finishing high school in the year 1975, (over 40 years ago) therefore, the Demandant is well past the age of majority;

Eight. in absence of evidence to the contrary, the Demandant is a man on the soil of Texas and devoid of any knowledge of surrendering or volunteering himself to the District of Columbia and their Social Security scam, or their US citizen scam, and hold any respondents to the strictest proof to the contrary, and as evidenced in the Corporate Denial Affidavit that is recorded with the Pinal County Recorder at Fee Number 2013-032373, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety;

Nine. The Demandant witnessed that it is impossible for the Demandant to be one of your US citizen slaves, because the Fourteenth Amendment requires that ONLY persons "born or naturalized in the United States"

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States..." Amendment XIV, Section 1

and the hearsay evidence shows that Defendant in Error was given birth on the soil of Alberta, Canada, but having said that, the Demandant does remember walking to school, in Peace River, Alberta, about 600 miles north of the Montana border, in the winter when it was -69 degrees farenheight, and the Demandant does remember finishing high school in 1975 in Raymond, Alberta, about 20 miles north of the Montana border, and neither has the Demandant been naturalized because "the sole authority" is through the Attorney General and by taking the Oath of Allegiance, which the Demandant has failed to do

"(a)AUTHORITY IN ATTORNEY GENERAL

The sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States is conferred upon the Attorney General.

(b)COURT AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER OATHS

(1)JURISDICTION Subject to section 1448(c) of this title—

(A)General jurisdiction

Except as provided in subparagraph (B), each applicant for naturalization may choose to have the oath of allegiance under section 1448(a) of this title administered by the Attorney General or by an eligible court described in paragraph (5). Each such eligible court shall have authority to administer such oath of allegiance to persons residing within the jurisdiction of the court.

(B)Exclusive authority

An eligible court described in paragraph (5) that wishes to have exclusive authority to administer the oath of allegiance under section 1448(a) of this title to persons residing within the jurisdiction of the court during the period described in paragraph (3)(A)(i) shall notify the Attorney General of such wish and, subject to this subsection, shall have such exclusive authority with respect to such persons during such period.” 8 U.S. Code § 1421. Naturalization authority

but the Demandant did claim American nationality through the United States Secretary of State, by right of blood, because the Demandant has ancestors who were here prior to the War of Independence, as evidenced by the true image of the Passport which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety

“Jura sanguinis nullo jure civili dirimi possunt. The right of blood and kindred cannot be destroyed by any civil law. Dig. 50, 17, 9; Bacon's Max. Reg. 11.”
Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1856 Edition, page 768

“the power which is derived cannot be greater than that from which it is derived”
– Deritiva potestas non potest esse major primitiva. – Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1856 Edition

and as evidenced in the **CORPORATE DENIAL AFFIDAVIT**, recorded with the Pinal County Recorder at **FEE NUMBER 2013-032373**, which is now the un rebutted truth, and public policy, which means that the Defendant is a free inhabitant as found in the Articles of Confederation

“.....the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States;.....” Article IV, Articles of Confederation (1781)

and in 1871 Congress created an unconstitutional municipal corporation called UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , to operate as government of the District of Columbia (as an edict under martial law)

“Two national governments exist, one to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its restrictions, the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument” Dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall Harlan. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 1901

and the unconstitutional municipal corporation fails to be **"The United States of America"**

"The Stile of this Confederacy shall be; "The United States of America"." Articles of Confederation, (1781) Article 1 [emphasis added]

and in 1845 the **"State of Texas"** is alleged to have joined both the Confederacy and the Union

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all the laws of the United States are hereby declared to extend to and over, and to have full force and effect within, the State of Texas, admitted at the present session of Congress into the Confederacy and Union of the United States." 9 Stat 1 [emphasis added]

which fails to be **"The State of Texas"**(a unconstitutional municipal corporation)

"There shall be a Seal of the State which shall be kept by the Secretary of State, and used by him officially under the direction of the Governor. The Seal of the State shall be a star of five points encircled by olive and live oak branches, and the words "The State of Texas."" Texas Constitution, Section 19. Seal of State [emphasis added]

and **The State of Texas** is a for profit corporation that was set up in 1845 as evidenced in the **Affidavit of Daniel-Lee: Swank** together with the two page Dunn and Bradstreet report that was attached thereto, all of which was recorded with the Liberty County Clerk on June 6, 2008 as filing number **2008010522** for a total of three pages, a true copy of which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, and nobody has any allegiance to an unconstitutional Roman Cult municipal corporation and ONLY those born in Federal Territory qualify potentially as US citizens

"Merely being native born within the territorial boundaries of the United States of America does not make such an inhabitant a Citizen of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the Fourteenth Amendment." Elk v. Wilkins, Neb (1884), 5s.ct.41, 112 U.S. 99, 28 L. Ed. 643.

"The persons declared to be citizens are, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction of thereof." The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject..." Elk v Wilkins, 112 US 94, 101, 102, (1884)

Ten. The Demandant has many good and honorable servants that work for governments on turtle Island, at various levels, and the Demandant has no idea what they get paid,

but in the Demandant's opinion, it is not enough, because we need people to hunt down thieves and murderers, and The Demandant is cognizant of the Demandant's duty to come to their aid when needed,

"Posse comitatus. Latin. The power or force of the county. The entire population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc. Williams v. State, 253 Ark. 973, 490 S.W.2d 117, 121." Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. 1990

but when they perjure their oaths and engage in unlawful activity, it is the Demandant's duty to bring their crimes to light, and to do everything the Demandant can to make sure they are brought to justice;

Eleven. even though your rule 201 of your rules of evidence, is foreign to me, as a man, the Demandant intends to compel any judge who reads this declaration, to give judicial notice, since so many of them like to be a bought and paid for clerks masquerading as a judge, and thereby pretend that some things are not said,

"Indeed, no more than (affidavits) are necessary to make the Prima facie case." United States V. Kis, 658 F. 2nd, 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1981); Cert Denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 2169; S. Ct March 22, 1982;

Twelve. on 22 November, 2019, The Demandant witnessed that Euless police Officer Graham subject the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's right to own "consumer goods" instead of "business equipment" under color of his codes as evidenced by the citation he gave the Demandant, a true copy of which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, all of which is in violation of

"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;"
18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law

Thirteen. The Demandant witnessed that Euless Police Officer Graham subject the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's Article V in Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America, right NOT to give evidence against himself in violation of their 18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law.

Fourteen. The Demandant witnessed that Euless Police Officer Graham subject the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's Article IV in Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America, right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, when there was no crime and no probable cause of a crime in violation of their 18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law.

Fifteen. The Demandant witnessed that Euless Police Officers Graham, Hurtado, Collingwood, and others conspire together to engage in false arrest

"The only thing the plaintiff needs to do is to allege a false arrest, is either (1) that the defendant made an arrest or imprisonment, or (2) that the defendant affirmatively instigated, encouraged, incited, or caused the arrest or imprisonment." Burlington v. Josephson, 153 Fed.2d 372,276 (1946)

"When the plaintiff has shown that he was arrested, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty by the defendant, "the law presumes it to be unlawful." People v. McGrew, 20 Pac. 92 (1888); Knight v. Baker, 133 P. 544(1926).

"The burden is upon the defendant (cop) to show that the arrest was by authority of law." McAleer v. Good, 65 Atl. 934, 935 (1907); Mackie v. Ambassador, 11 P.2d 6 (1932).

"ANY ARREST, made without a PROPER warrant, Signed by a judge and backed up by an affidavit from two persons that states, under penalty of perjury, you have broken a contract or hurt somebody, if challenged by the defendant (person), is presumptively invalid...the burden is upon the state" to justify it as authorized by statute, and does not violate the constitutional provisions and Or(human rights.) State v. Mastrian, 171 N.W.2d 695 (1969); Butler v. State, 212 So.2d 577 (Miss 1968)

"As in the case of illegal arrests, the officer... must keep within the law at his peril." Thiede v. Scandia, 217 Minn. 231, 14 N.W.2d 400 (1944)

Sixteen. The Demandant witnessed that Euless Police Officers Graham, Hurtado, Collingwood, and others conspire together to threaten, coerce, intimidate, and injure the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant's rights to 1) fail to give evidence against himself under Article V in Amendment, 2) own "consumer goods" instead of "business equipment" under the Texas Business and Commerce Code 9.109, and 3) the Demandant's right to be left alone

"They conferred as against the government the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v United States 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), Washington v Harper, 494 U. S. 210 (1990).

Seventeen. The Demandant witnessed that under the International Law Uniform Commercial Code, there is "consumer goods" and "business equipment"

"Goods are;

(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes;

(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods;"
Texas Business and Commerce Code 9.109 Classification of Goods: "Consumer Goods"; "Equipment"; "Farm Products"; "Inventory".

and they are both exclusive

"Under UCC §9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative." James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).

"The classification of goods in UCC §9-109 are mutually exclusive." McFadden v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971)

and an automobile used for travelling to and from work, or for personal, family, or household use, is considered "consumer goods"

"Automobile purchased for the purpose of transporting buyer to and from his place of employment was "consumer goods" as defined in UCC §9-109."
Mallicoat v Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. App., 1966)

"Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled." Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20

"The provisions of UCC §2-316 of the Maryland UCC do not apply to sales of consumer goods (a term which includes automobiles, whether new or used, that are bought primarily for personal, family, or household use)." Maryland Independent Automobile Dealers Assoc., Inc. v Administrator, Motor Vehicle Admin., 25 UCC Rep Serv 699; 394 A.2d 820, 41 Md App 7 (1978)

"The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of." Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907)

“A soldier's personal automobile is part of his “household goods[.]” U.S. v Bomar, C.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235” 19A Words and Phrases - Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94

“... [T]he exemptions provided for in section 1 of the Motor Vehicle Transportation License Act of 1925 (Stats. 1925, p. 833) in favor of those who solely transport their own property or employees, or both, and of those who transport no persons or property for hire or compensation, by motor vehicle, have been determined in the Bacon Service Corporation case to be lawful exemptions. --In re Schmolke (1926) 199 Cal. 42, 46

“Consumer goods – automobile for transportation to and from work. The use of a vehicle by its owner for purposes of travelling to and from his employment is a personal, as opposed to a business use, as that term is used in UCC 9-109(1) and the vehicle will be classified as consumer goods rather than equipment.” In Re Barnes, 11 UCC Reporting Service 670

and a vehicle used as consumer goods is NOT required to be registered, or use tax paid

“A vehicle not used for commercial activity is a “consumer goods”, . . . it is NOT a type of vehicle required to be registered and “use tax” paid of which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax.” Bank of Boston v. Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14

and automobiles used for consumer goods MUST be exempted from Registration and taxation

“In view of this rule a statutory provision that the supervising officials “may” exempt such persons when the transportation is not on a commercial basis means that they “must” exempt them.” --State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 60 C.J.S. section 94, page 581

and under the Texas Constitution, consumer goods (household goods), like the Demandant's private car, since the Demandant fails to use the vehicle to carry passengers or property for hire, are not subject to taxation,

“(d) The Legislature by general law shall exempt from ad valorem taxation household goods not held or used for the production of income and personal effects not held or used for the production of income.” Article 8, Sec. 1 (d) Texas Constitution [emphasis added]

“(a) .. a political subdivision of this state may not require an owner of a motor vehicle to; (1) register the vehicle;
(2) pay a motor vehicle registration fee; or
(3) pay an occupation tax or license fee in connection with motor vehicle.” Texas Transportation Code § 502.003. Registration By Political Subdivision Prohibited

but Euless Military Police Officer Graham didn't care about any of that, and soon there was three other Euless Military Police vehicles with Graham's supervisor , Hurtado, and another officer Collingwood as his accomplices;

Eighteen. The Demandant witnessed that terrorism is a system of government that seeks to rule by intimidation

"Terrorism - *noun* – 2 A system of government that seeks to rule by intimidation." Funk and Wagnal's New Practical Standard Dictionary (1946);

Nineteen. the commencement of the wrong and harm was on or about November 22, 2019 at approximately 8:30 pm in the evening, as evidenced by the citation #4098295 that they assaulted the Demandant with, a true copy of which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety;

Twenty. all documents recorded with the Pinal County Recorder may be viewed at their website link below; <https://acclaim.pinalcountyz.gov/AcclaimWeb/>

Twenty-one. it is well established that the union army invaded Texas in 1862 and put Texas under Martial Law,

"...Martial Law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest. The presence of a hostile army proclaims its Martial Law." Article 1, Lieber Code [emphasis added]

"Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.." Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Article 42;

Twenty-two. The Demandant witnessed that the ONLY way that Martial Law ends is by specific mention in a Treaty of Peace, or by special proclamation by the commander in chief,

"Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by special proclamation, ordered by the commander in chief; or by special mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war,...." Article 2, Lieber Code [emphasis added];

Twenty-three. The Demandant witnessed that there was no treaty of peace with Texas or the Confederacy, and there have been no special proclamations ending the Martial Law by the President of the United States (the commander in chief), therefore martial law continues to this day;

Twenty-four. The Demandant witnessed that "Martial Law affects chiefly the police...", therefore all police are military police,

"Martial Law affects chiefly the police and collection of public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled government or by the invader, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of the army, its safety, and the safety of its operations." Lieber Code, Article 10 [emphasis added];

Twenty-five. The Demandant witnessed that Martial Law ONLY affects "subjects of the enemy" and aliens

"Martial Law extends to property, and to persons, whether they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government." Lieber Code, Article 7 [emphasis added]

and subjects are government employees and corporations and anything created by the government

"All subjects over which the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of taxation, but those over which it does not extend are exempt from taxation. This proposition may also be pronounced as self-evident. The sovereignty of the state extends to everything which exists by its authority or its permission." McCullough v Maryland, 17 U.S. [4 Wheat] 316 (1819). [emphasis added]

or have received privileges by way of a contract

"The rights of sovereignty extend to all persons and things, not privileged that are within the territory. They extend to all strangers resident therein; not only to those who are naturalized, and to those who are domiciled therein, having taken up their abode with the intention of permanent residence, but also to those whose residence is transitory. All strangers are under the protection of the sovereign while they are within his territory and owe a temporary allegiance in return for that protection." Carlisle v United States 83 U.S. 147, 154 (1873)

and subjects are subject to the regulations and therefore property and slaves are property

"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the.... other property belonging to the United States....." Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2, Constitution for the United States of America

and this is true in all corporations masquerading as governments

"Section 2 Definitions (1) In this Act, owned means, subject to the regulations,.....;"Canadian Ownership and Control Determination Act;

and in 1794 (except for The United States of America) there were no "nations" but there were "are considered as forming a society" (corporations)

"A State does not owe its origin to the Government of the United States, in the

highest or in any of its branches. It was in existence before it. It derives its authority from the same pure and sacred source as itself: The voluntary and deliberate choice of the people... A State is altogether exempt from the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States, or from any other exterior authority, unless in the special instances where the general Government has power derived from the Constitution itself... p. 448 "The question to be determined is, whether this State, so respectable, and whose claim soars so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States? This question, important in itself, will depend on others, more important still; and may perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less radical than this- "do the people of the United States form a NATION? "By that law the several States and Governments spread over our globe, are considered as forming a society, not a NATION." [caps in the original.] Chisholm. Ex'r v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1794),

Twenty-six. The Demandant witnessed that under Texas Codes, a Crime is defined by Texas Government Code is a Misdemeanor that can be punished by jail, and a felony, **"(5) Crime means (A) a misdemeanor punishable by confinement (jail); or (B) a felony"** Texas Government Code § 79.001 Definitions;

Twenty-seven. The Demandant witnessed that a Class C Misdemeanor can be punished by fine ONLY and failure to appear is punished by fine ONLY **"(e) An offense under this section is a Class "C" misdemeanor if the offense for which the actor's appearance is required is punishable by fine only."** Texas Penal Code § 38.10 Bail Jumping and Failure to Appear;

Twenty-eight. The Demandant witnessed that conviction of a Class C Misdemeanor does not impose any legal disability or disadvantage **"(c) Conviction of a Class C misdemeanor does not impose any legal disability or disadvantage,"** Texas Penal Code § 12.03 Classification of Misdemeanor;

Twenty-nine. The Demandant witnessed that somebody convicted with a Class C Misdemeanor can be fined ONLY a maximum of \$500 **"An individual adjudged guilty of a Class "C" misdemeanor shall be punished by fine only, not to exceed \$500."** Texas Penal Code § 12.23 Class (C) Misdemeanors (edict under the Roman Cult's martial law)

therefore, a Class C Misdemeanor fails to be a crime, and is therefore a civil dispute;

Thirty. The Demandant witnessed that a warrant may not be issued for a Class C Misdemeanor

"(a) If the owner of the motor vehicle fails to timely pay the amount of the civil penalty imposed against the owner: (1) an arrest warrant may NOT be issued for

the owner; & (2) the imposition of the civil penalty may not be recorded on the owner's driving record." Texas Transportation Code § 707.019 Failure to Pay Civil Penalty [emphasis added];

Thirty-one. The Demandant witnessed that the Demandant was travelling to LA Fitness to work out in Euless, Texas, at approximately 8:30 pm on 22 November 2019';

Thirty-two. The Demandant witnessed that when a Military Police Officer to stops anybody, it is an arrest

"A motorist stopped by a traffic officer for a traffic offense would be considered "arrested" . . . even if the motorist was not specifically informed that he had been arrested." People ex rel. Winkle v. Bannan, 125 N.W.2d 875, 879, 372 Mich. 292

"Any restraint, however slight, upon another's liberty to come and go as one pleases, constitutes an "arrest." Swetnam v. W.F. Woolworth Co., 318 P.2d 364, 366, 83 Ariz. 189. [emphasis added];

Thirty-three. The Demandant witnessed that in order for any Police Officer to stop anyone he MUST have probable cause that a crime had taken place

Article Four in Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from arresting citizens without probable cause (citations omitted); in cases Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F.Supp.2d 512, 561-62, 564 (D.N.J. 2000); Hill v. Algor, 85 F.Supp.2d 391, 397-98 (D.N.J. 2000) **arrest made without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment**; Rzyayeva v. Foster, 134 F.Supp.2d 239, 248-49 (D.Conn. 2001) **holding involuntary civil confinement is a "massive curtailment of liberty", is tantamount to the infringement of being arrested and can be made only upon probable cause**, citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980); Schneider v. Simonini, 749 A.2d 336, 163 N.J. 336, 361-65 (2000)

The test for police officer's sufficient basis for probable cause -- did the officer have a sufficient basis to make a "practical, common sense" decision that a "fair probability of crime existed," -- once the officer's actions fail to satisfy this test, it may appear that no reasonably objective officer could have believed that probable cause existed to make an arrest; Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (citing cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits) **held that "by definition, probable cause to arrest can only exist in relation to criminal conduct; civil disputes cannot give rise to probable cause**; Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 435 (3rd Cir. 2000)

Thirty-four. The Demandant was at a red light waiting to turn, the Demandant noticed Euless Military Police Officer Graham behind the Demandant and the light turned green and as the Demandant started to turn, Graham turned on his emergency lights, and the Demandant pulled over;

Thirty-five. The Demandant witnessed Euless Military Police Officer Graham Abusing his Official Capacity in violation of his Texas Penal Code by turning on his emergency lights when no probable cause existed of a crime, therefore no emergency. Generating Revenue is NOT an emergency

“(a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly:

(1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment; or

(2) misuses government property, services, personnel, or any other thing of value belonging to the government that has come into the public servant's custody or possession by virtue of the public servant's office or employment.”

Texas Penal Code Sec. 39.02 Abuse of Official Capacity [emphasis added];

Thirty-six. The Demandant dialed 9-1-1 and asked for the County Sheriff to come to the scene.

Thirty-seven. The 9-1-1 call went to the Euless Military Police switchboard and they said they were sending the police supervisor

Thirty-eight. The Demandant told them several times that the Demandant wanted the County Sheriff, and they finally refused to send the County Sheriff.

Thirty-nine. The Demandant witnessed that when he was in the Euless jail, a friend called the Tarrant County Sheriff's Office and told them that the Demandant had been demanding the County Sheriff to come to the scene and they refused to come.

Forty. the Demandant has added the Tarrant County Sheriff's Office because they are the highest law enforcement officer in the county and they are supposed to be protecting the Demandant from these privateers and the Demandant is hoping that this is coming from bureaucrats and NOT Bill Waybourn, but the Demandant reserves the Demandant's right to add Waybourn if it turns out that this negligence is because of some policy Waybourne has put in place.

Forty-one. The Demandant witnessed Euless Military Police Officer Graham, engage in Official Oppression by threatening his “Failure to Identify” statute

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information. Texas Penal Code, Section 38.02.

Failure to Identify

because they had no probable cause to arrest me, there was no crime, and there was no lawful arrest, and Graham was operating in his private capacity as a revenue officer, therefore there was no Peace Officer present, and it was Graham's job to know that.

Forty-two. The Demandant told Graham that he was engaged in Abuse of Official Capacity and read to him the Texas Penal Code 38.02 because Graham had turned on his emergency lights and was using government property for something that is NOT a crime, and the Demandant read him the statute from a laminated sheet that had been prepared for a case like this, a true copy of which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

Forty-three. The Demandant told Graham that he was engaged in Official Oppression and read to him the Texas Penal Code 39.03 because he had turned on his emergency lights and was using government property for something that is NOT a crime, and read Graham the statute from a laminated sheet that had been prepared for a case like this, a true copy of which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

Forty-four. The Demandant told Graham that the Texas Transportation Code says that nobody may require anybody to register their vehicle, pay the tax, or license fee
“(a) .. a political subdivision of this state may not require an owner of a motor vehicle to: (1) register the vehicle; (2) pay a motor vehicle registration fee; or (3) pay an occupation tax or license fee in connection with motor vehicle.” Texas Transportation Code § 502.003. Registration By Political Subdivision Prohibited

therefore, there is no law that says that anybody has to register a vehicle, and the Demandant read to him their statute from a laminated sheet that had been prepared for a case like this, a true copy of which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

Forty-five. The Demandant witnessed Euless Military Police Officer Graham, together with his supervisor Hurtado, and another accomplice Collingwood, and others over the radio, engage in official oppression in violation of their

“(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful; (2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or

(b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity. Texas Penal Code Sec. 39.03 Official Oppression [emphasis added];

Forty-six. The Demandant witnessed that Graham told the Demandant to exit the Demandant's car and the Demandant put the Demandant's phone in the Demandant's pocket and put a "Forbidden Zone" laminated sheet on the dash that had very large letters

Private Vehicle NO TRESPASSING Forbidden Zone

followed by

Texas Penal Code § 30.04. Burglary of Vehicles.

(a) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he breaks into or enters a vehicle or any part of a vehicle with intent to commit any felony or theft.

Texas Penal Code § 30.05. Criminal Trespass.

(a) A person commits an offense if he enters or remains on or in property, ... or other vehicle, of another without effective consent ... & he:

(1) had notice that the entry was forbidden; or

(2) received notice to depart but failed to do so.

(b) For purposes of this section:

(2) "Notice" means:

(A) oral or written communication by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner;

(e) A person commits an offense if without express consent or if without authorization provided by any law, whether in writing or other form, the person:

(3) had notice that the entry was forbidden or received notice to depart but failed to do so.

a true copy of which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, but they and their towing company intended to engage in criminal trespass because they eventually towed the Demandant's vehicle after they took the Demandant to their jail.

Forty-seven. The Euless Military Police Officer Graham kept asking for a "drivers license" and the Demandant kept telling them that he had none and that the Demandant's automobile was considered "consumer goods" and not subject to regulation, or taxation or licensing.

Forty-eight. The Demandant witnessed that Eules Military Police Officer Graham illegally and unlawfully subjected the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, as protected by Article IV in Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America, when he failed to have probable cause of a crime in violation of

“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;”

18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law

Forty-nine. The Demandant witnessed that Eules Military Police Officer Graham with his supervisor Hurtado, and accomplices Collingwood, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey, Jenny, and others, each individually, illegally and unlawfully subjected the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's right NOT to give evidence against himself under Article V in Amendment, to the Constitution for the United States of America, when Graham failed to have probable cause of a crime in violation of 18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law.

Fifty. The Demandant witnessed that Eules Military Police Officer Graham illegally and unlawfully subjected the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's right to have “consumer Goods” instead of “business equipment” as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code 9-109 Classification of Goods: “Consumer Goods”; “Equipment”; “Farm Products”; “Inventory”, and as described herein, in violation of 18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law.

Fifty-one. The Demandant witnessed that Eules Military Police Supervisor Hurtado gave his subordinate Graham permission to arrest the Demandant and they put the Demandant in handcuffs and took the Demandant to their torture chamber (jail) where they tortured the Demandant to get the Demandant's fingerprints so they could retrieve hearsay information from their computer database, and they force fed the demandant poisons like dead pig.

Fifty-two. The Demandant witnessed that the jail cell they put the Demandant in was concrete everywhere with no wood or mattress or padding anywhere, and there was an air conditioning vent in the ceiling with cold air coming out of it, and they took the

Demandant's jacket, so all I had on was jeans and a light shirt, while the temperature of the jail cell was approximately 40 degrees and the Demandant couldn't sit down because everything was so cold, which is evidence of their intent to subject the Demandant to their torture techniques of their forced cold jail cell and also they intended to subject the Demandant to sleep deprivation as their agenda to take reprisals against the Demandant for the Demandant's political beliefs.

Fifty-three. The Demandant witnessed Euless Military Police Officer Graham with his supervisor Hurtado, and accomplices Collingwood, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey, Jenny, and others, and their B & B Wrecker Service, engage in burglary of the Demandant's vehicle

Texas Penal Code § 30.04. Burglary of Vehicles.

(a) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he breaks into or enters a vehicle or any part of a vehicle with intent to commit any felony or theft.

and Criminal Trespass

Texas Penal Code § 30.05. Criminal Trespass.

(a) A person commits an offense if he enters or remains on or in property, ... or other vehicle, of another without effective consent ... & he:

(1) had notice that the entry was forbidden; or

(2) received notice to depart but failed to do so.

(b) For purposes of this section:

(2) "Notice" means:

(A) oral or written communication by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner;

(e) A person commits an offense if without express consent or if without authorization provided by any law, whether in writing or other form, the person:

(3) had notice that the entry was forbidden or received notice to depart but failed to do so.

Upon the Demandant's private property automobile and they engaged in the theft of the Demandant's property and held it for ransom of \$258.10 to get it back

Fifty-four. The Demandant witnessed that a name is hearsay, and an address is hearsay, and a date of birth is hearsay and hearsay evidence is inadmissible in any court of law unless the Defendant in any case admits the hearsay evidence.

Fifty-five. The Demandant witnessed Euless Military Police Officer Graham with his supervisor Hurtado, and accomplices Collingwood, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey,

Jenny, and others, conspire together to threaten, oppress, injure, and intimidate the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant's right to have "consumer goods" instead of "business equipment"

"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ...They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; ..." 18 USC § 241 Conspiracy to Violate Rights under Color of Law

Fifty-six. The Demandant witnessed Euless Military Police Officer Graham eventually issued to the Demandant a citation for "Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibility", and "Registration (No Plates Insignia)", all of which are Class C Misdemeanors, a true copy of CITY OF EULESS, TEXAS – CITATION 4098295 is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, and which are NOT crimes, and evidence of their failure to have probable cause to stop the Demandant;

Fifty-seven. The Demandant witnessed Euless Military Police Officer Graham, together with his supervisor Hurtado, and accomplices Collingwood, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey, Jenny, and others, over the radio, engage in a malicious prosecution

"Although probable cause may not be inferred from malice, malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause." Pauley v. Hall, 335 N. W. 2d 197, 124 Mich App 255

and Official Oppression when they arrested the Demandant for something that fails to be a crime and with no probable cause

"(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he:

(1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful;

(2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or

(b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity." Texas Penal Code Sec. 39.03 Official Oppression [emphasis added]

Fifty-eight. The Demandant witnessed that i told the jail guard that under Texas Transportation Code they may NOT issue a Warrant for a Class C Misdemeanor

"(a) If the owner of the motor vehicle fails to timely pay the amount of the civil penalty imposed against the owner: (1) an arrest warrant may NOT be issued for

the owner; & (2) the imposition of the civil penalty may not be recorded on the owner's driving record." Texas Transportation Code § 707.019 Failure to Pay Civil Penalty [emphasis added];

because a Class C Misdemeanor fails to be a crime,

"(5) Crime means (A) a misdemeanor punishable by confinement (jail); or (B) a felony" Texas Government Code § 79.001 Definitions;

"(e) An offense under this section is a Class "C" misdemeanor if the offense for which the actor's appearance is required is punishable by fine only." Texas Penal Code § 38.10 Bail Jumping and Failure to Appear;

"(c) Conviction of a Class C misdemeanor does not impose any legal disability or disadvantage," Texas Penal Code § 12.03 Classification of Misdemeanor;

"An individual adjudged guilty of a Class "C" misdemeanor shall be punished by fine only, not to exceed \$500." Texas Penal Code § 12.23 Class (C) Misdemeanors (edict under the Roman Cult's martial law)

and they may ONLY issue a capias after a trial and conviction

"In this chapter: (1) "Capias" means a writ that is: (A) issued by a court having jurisdiction of a case after judgment and sentence;

(2) "Capias pro fine" means a writ that is:

(A) issued by a court having jurisdiction of a case after judgment and sentence for unpaid fines and costs; and....." Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 43.015 Definitions

and a capias fails to be a "Warrant"

"A capias is NOT a "Warrant of Arrest,"...." Knox v State, 586 S.W. 2d 504, 506 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) [emphasis added]

and the jail guard told the Demandant that as long as his computer says it is a warrant that is all he needs to know, which means that he intends to perjure his oath and they intend to engage in all of the crimes described herein, and it doesn't matter what Texas statutes, codes rules and regulations say.

Fifty-nine. The Demandant witnessed that Euless Military Police Officer Graham said in the Police Report narrative that the ONLY Identification they found was a Republic of Texas Diplomatic Identification card and the original stop was because I had a home made Republic of Texas plate on the Demandant's "consumer goods", all of which is evidence of their intent to take reprisals against the Demandant for the Demandant's political beliefs in violation of their

“No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.

Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.” Article 33, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 [emphasis added].

“Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.

...all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.” Article 33, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 [emphasis added]

especially in light of the fact that they completely ignored the FORBIDDEN ZONE sign that I had placed on the dash of the Demandant’s “consumer goods” except that they placed it in the guest seat, thereby evidencing their intent to engage in Criminal Trespass in violation of their Texas Penal Code 30.05, and further take reprisals against the Demandant’s property with their illegal and unlawful seizure and their having it towed and forcing the Demandant to pay over \$250 to get it back in violation of Article IV in Amendment.

Sixty. The Demandant witnessed that Euless Military Police Officer Graham also charged the Demandant with Failure to Identify – Fugitive from Justice

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information. Texas Penal Code, Section 38.02. Failure to Identify [emphasis added]

when they are required to know that there was no crime, they failed to have probable cause to stop me, which means that Graham was NOT in his official capacity as a Peace Officer, but was in his private capacity

“An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government”. Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F. Supp. 94

“OATH....All oaths must be lawful, allowed by the common law, or some statute; if they are administered by persons in a private capacity, or not duly authorized, they are *coram non iudice*, and void;... 3 Inst. 165; 4 Inst. 278; 2 Roll. Abr. 277.” Tomlin’s Law Dictionary, 1835 Edition, Volume 2 [emphasis added],

as a revenue officer under the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966

"(h) DEFINITION's. "

"(1) SECURITY INTEREST.-The term 'security interest' means any interest in property acquired by contract for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation or indemnifying against loss or liability. A security interest exists at any time

(A) if, at such time, the property is in existence and the interest has become protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation, and

(B) to the extent that, at such time, the holder has parted "with money or money's worth.

"(3) MOTOR VEHICLE.-The term 'motor vehicle' means a self-propelled vehicle which is registered for highway use under the laws of any State or foreign country.

"(4) SECURITY.-The term 'security' means any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by a corporation or a government or political subdivision thereof, with interest coupons or in registered form, share of stock, voting trust certificate, or any certificate of interest or participation in, certificate of deposit or receipt for, temporary or interim certificate for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing: negotiable instrument: or money." Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 at Public Law 89-719 at 80 Stat. 1130-1131.

and since he was wearing a Peace Officer's uniform, he was impersonating a Peace Officer in violation of your Texas codes,

"(a) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) impersonates a public servant with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely on his pretended official acts; or

(2) knowingly purports to exercise any function of a public servant or of a public office, including that of a judge and court, and the position or office through which he purports to exercise a function of a public servant or public office has no lawful existence under the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree." Texas Penal Code, Section 37.11. IMPERSONATING PUBLIC SERVANT, [emphasis added],

Sixty-one. The Demandant witnessed Euless Military Police Officer Graham together with with his supervisor Hurtado, and accomplices Collingwood, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey, Jenny, and others, over the radio, impersonate a public servant

"(a) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) impersonates a public servant with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely on his pretended official acts; or

(2) knowingly purports to exercise any function of a public servant or of a public office, including that of a judge and court, and the position or office through which he purports to exercise a function of a public servant or public office has

no lawful existence under the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree." Texas Penal Code, Section 37.11 Impersonating Public Servant, [emphasis added]

Sixty-two. The Demandant witnessed that these Euless Military Police Officer Graham and the others present, together with supervisors and others over the radio, and their Jail guards think they can claim "good faith"

"(e)DEFENSE.—A good faith reliance on—

(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization (including a request of a governmental entity under section 2703(f) of this title);

(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or

(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;

is a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law." 18 US Code 2707 Civil Action

"(a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.

(b) It is an exception to the provisions of Subsection (a) of this Article that the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause." Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 38.23 Evidence Not to Be Used [emphasis added]

but their "good faith" claim is based upon a Warrant, and they are required to know Texas Statutes prohibit a Warrant from being issued

"(a) If the owner of the motor vehicle fails to timely pay the amount of the civil penalty imposed against the owner: (1) an arrest warrant may NOT be issued for the owner; & (2) the imposition of the civil penalty may not be recorded on the owner's driving record." Texas Transportation Code § 707.019 Failure to Pay Civil Penalty [emphasis added]

and they are required to know that their so-called Warrants were in fact capias' which is NOT a Warrant

"A capias is NOT a "Warrant of Arrest,"...." Knox v State, 586 S.W. 2d 504, 506 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979)

and a capias may ONLY be issued after a trial and conviction

"In this chapter: (1) "Capias" means a writ that is: (A) issued by a court having

jurisdiction of a case after judgment and sentence; and (B) directed "To any peace officer of the State of Texas" and commanding the officer to arrest a person convicted of an offense and bring the arrested person before that court immediately or on a day or at a term stated in the writ.

(2) "Capias pro fine" means a writ that is:

(A) issued by a court having jurisdiction of a case after judgment and sentence for unpaid fines and costs; and

(B) directed "To any peace officer of the State of Texas" and commanding the officer to arrest a person convicted of an offense and bring the arrested person before that court immediately." Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 43.015 Definitions

which is evidence of their intent to subject the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's right to due process under Article V in Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America, in violation of

"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;"
18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law

Sixty-three. The Demandant witnessed that the Euless Magistrate, Lacey Britton, signed **"Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order"** for the charge of **"Failure to Identify – Fugitive from Justice"**, when she is required to know that the reason for the stop fails to be a crime and the Fugitive from Justice issue is because of a capias issued by Lake Worth because of Class C Misdemeanors which also fail to be crimes, which is evidence that Lacey Britton was NOT operating in her official capacity as a Judge,

"ANY ARREST, made without a PROPER warrant, Signed by a judge and backed up by an affidavit from two persons that states, under penalty of perjury, you have broken a contract or hurt somebody, if challenged by the defendant (person), is presumptively invalid...the burden is upon the state" to justify it as authorized by statute, and does not violate the constitutional provisions and Or(human rights.) State v. Mastrian, 171 N.W.2d 695 (1969); Butler v. State, 212 So.2d 577 (Miss 1968)

but Britton has demonstrated that she intends to be a (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge

""When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative

officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts administrating or enforcing statutes do not act judicially, but merely ministerially....but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved agency -- but only in a "ministerial" and not a "discretionary capacity..." Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464 [emphasis added]

"It is the accepted rule, not only in state courts, but, of the federal courts as well, that when a judge is enforcing administrative law they are described as mere 'extensions of the administrative agency for superior reviewing purposes' as a ministerial clerk for an agency..." 30 Cal 596; 167 Cal 762

"...judges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes (civil or criminal in nature and otherwise), act as mere "clerks" of the involved agency..." K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 (CTP. West's 1965 Ed.)

and when a clerk (masquerading as judge) is an agent for the administrative agency it is always a kangaroo court and a Bill of Pains and Penalties because it is a non-judicial proceeding

"Kangaroo court. Term descriptive of a sham legal proceeding in which a person's rights are totally disregarded and in which the result is a foregone conclusion because of the bias of the court or other tribunal." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 868, [emphasis added]

"Bill of Attainder" means Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448-49, 85 S. Ct. 1707, 1715, 14 L.Ed. 484, 492; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1079, 90 L.Ed. 1252

"bill of attainder. 2. A special legislative act prescribing punishment, without a trial, for a specific person or group. • Bills of attainder are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution (art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, § 10, cl. 1). — Also termed act of attainder. See ATTAINDER; BILL OF PAINS AND PENALTIES . [Cases: Constitutional Law 82.5. C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 429–431.]" Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 496

"BILL OF PAINS AND PENALTIES bill of pains and penalties. A legislative act that, though similar to a bill of attainder, prescribes punishment less severe than capital punishment. • Bills of pains and penalties are included within the U.S. Constitution's ban on bills of attainder. U.S. Const. art I, § 9. [Cases: Constitutional Law 82.5. C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 429–431.]" Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 499

and everything Britton does is a fraud and a nullity

"Ministerial officers are incompetent to receive grants of judicial power from the

legislature, their acts in attempting to exercise such powers are necessarily nullities" Burns v. Sup., Ct., SF, 140 Cal. 1

"Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has been the law from the days of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke 68; also Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335,351." Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948.

and a void judgment

"A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect" Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298 (C.A. 1 Mass. 1972). Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980)

"Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need not be attacked directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed." City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1973)

"A void judgment, insofar as it purports to be pronouncement of court, is an absolute nullity" Thompson v. Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. – Waco 1951)

"Void order may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, at any time" In re Estate of Steinfeld, 630 N.E.2d 801, certiorari denied, See also Steinfeld v. Hoddick, 513 U.S. 809, (Ill. 1994)

"A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of enforcement in any manner or to any degree." Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)

"Not every action by any judge is in exercise of his judicial function. It is not a judicial function for a Judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the Courthouse, when a judge acts as a Trespasser of the Law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject matter jurisdiction and The Judge's orders are void, of no legal force or effect"! Yates Vs. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962)

and everything Britton does is brutum fulmen

"brutum fulmen": "An empty noise; an empty threat. A judgment void upon its face which is in legal effect no judgment at all, and by which no rights are divested, and from which none can be obtained; and neither binds nor bars anyone. Dollert v. Pratt-Hewitt Oil Corporation, Tex.Civ.Appl, 179 S.W.2d 346, 348. Also, see Corpus Juris Secundum, "Judgments" §§ 499, 512 546, 549. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition

Sixty-four. Britton is required to know that "State of Texas" is a assumed name for Deer Park Cash Cow, LLC as evidenced by the Certificate of Fact signed by the Texas Secretary of State, a true copy of which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, which means that the real part of interest in her "Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order" for the charge of "Failure to Identify – Fugitive from Justice", is Deer Park Cash Cow, LLC, and she is impersonating a Judge

"(a) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) impersonates a public servant with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely on his pretended official acts; or

(2) knowingly purports to exercise any function of a public servant or of a public office, including that of a judge and court, and the position or office through which he purports to exercise a function of a public servant or public office has no lawful existence under the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree." Texas Penal Code, Section 37.11. IMPERSONATING PUBLIC SERVANT, [emphasis added]

Sixty-five. Britton's fraudulent "PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION AND COMMITMENT ORDER" shows "State of Texas" which is an assumed name for Deer Park Cash Cow, LLC which goes on to say; "IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS" when it should read "IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF DEER PARK CASH COW, LLC", but then the Tarrant County Sheriff's office might fail to act on it which is why Britton deliberately, calculatedly, and maliciously made it the way they did, but the County Sheriff is also supposed to know that "State of Texas" fails to be "The State of Texas", therefore the Tarrant County Sheriff is also responsible for the Demandant's false arrest and false imprisonment.

Sixty-six. Britton has demonstrated that she is in bad behavior

"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour," Constitution for the United States of America, Article 3, Section 1

and is engaged in fraud upon the court

"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted, or influenced, or

influence is attempted, or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- i.e., where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted." Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985)

and Britton has demonstrated that she fails to be neutral or unbiased

"It is a fundamental right of a party to have a neutral and detached judge preside over the judicial proceedings." Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62, 93 S.Ct 80, 83, 34 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1972); Tumey v Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 5209, 47 S. Ct. 437, 440, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)

Sixty-seven. Britton intends to be a military commissioner under Martial Law under Article 13 of the Lieber Code

"Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred and defined by statute; second, that which is derived from the common law of war. Military offenses under the statute law must be tried in the manner therein directed; but military offenses which do not come within the statute must be tried and punished under the common law of war. The character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions depends upon the local laws of each particular country.

In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by courts-martial, while cases which do not come within the "Rules and Articles of War," or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-martial, are tried by military commissions." Article 13, Lieber Code

Sixty-eight. Britton has demonstrated that she intends to impersonate a public servant

"(a) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) impersonates a public servant with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely on his pretended official acts; or
(2) knowingly purports to exercise any function of a public servant or of a public office, including that of a judge and court, and the position or office through which he purports to exercise a function of a public servant or public office has no lawful existence under the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree." Texas Penal Code, Section 37.11. IMPERSONATING PUBLIC SERVANT, [emphasis added]

Sixty-nine. Britton has falsely accused the Demandant of being a "Defendant" thereby demonstrating that this case is pre-judged because a "Defendant" under their edicts under Martial Law is someone accused of a Crime

"(6) "DEFENDANT" means a person accused of a crime" Texas Government Code § 79.001 Definitions

when all of the charges in this case are Class C Misdemeanor which is punishable by fine ONLY

“An individual adjudged guilty of a Class “C” misdemeanor shall be punished by fine only, not to exceed \$500.” Texas Penal Code § 12.23 Class (C) Misdemeanors (edict under the Roman Cult’s martial law)

and under their edicts under Martial Law, a “Crime” is defined as an offense that can be punished by jail

“(5) Crime means (A) a misdemeanor punishable by confinement (jail); or (B) a felony” Texas Government Code § 79.001 Definitions

Seventy. Britton has demonstrated that she fails to be neutral or unbiased

“It is a fundamental right of a party to have a neutral and detached judge preside over the judicial proceedings.” Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62, 93 S.Ct 80, 83, 34 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1972); Tumey v Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 5209, 47 S. Ct. 437, 440, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)

Seventy-one. Britton intends to be an accomplice to the Privateers, Graham, Hurtado, Collingwood, Britton, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey, Jenny, and others, to make war on me

“A mixed war is one which is made on one side by public authority, and the other by mere private persons.” Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 1420

“Under International Law of Warfare, all parties to a cause must appear by nom de guerre, because an “alien enemy cannot maintain an action during the war in his own name”. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, pg. 1534;

Seventy-two. Britton intends to be an accomplice to the Privateer, Graham, Hurtado, Collingwood, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey, Jenny, and others, to take reprisals against he Demandant for the Demandant’s political beliefs in violation of their own

“No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.

Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.” Article 33, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 [emphasis added]

and the truth of the matter is that Graham and his accomplices Hurtado, Collingwood, Britton, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey, Jenny, and others, are all a gang of privateers, and they the terrorists that they claim to be fighting

“Terrorism - *noun* – 2 A system of government that seeks to rule by intimidation.” Funk and Wagnal’s New Practical Standard Dictionary (1946)

Seventy-three. Britton has demonstrated that she intends to degrade the Demandant in her District of Columbia kangaroo court that is staffed with US citizens, with her show-trial

"and because it brings into action, and enforces this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that fellow citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each other in their own courts to have their controversies determined." Chisholm v Georgia 2 Dall. 440, [Emphasis added],

when they know that no government employee is competent to sit on a jury

"An employee of United States is not qualified to serve as member of grand jury in any District." UNITED STATES v. GRIFFITH et al., 2 F.2d 925, (Court of Appeals of District of Columbia. Submitted October 9, 1924. Decided December 1, 1924.), No. 4114

and the ONLY jurors possible are US citizen slaves as required by the Reconstruction Acts

"(13) the term "Federal personnel" means officers and employees of the Government of the United States, members of the uniformed services (including members of the Reserve Components), individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States (including survivor benefits)." 5 USC § 552a.(a)(13) [emphasis added]

and it is impossible for the Demandant to be a US citizen, since the Demandant has failed to be born or naturalized in the Jurisdiction of the United States as required by their edict under Martial Law 14th Amendment, as previously declared herein, therefore, US citizens fail to be the Demandant's peers.

Seventy-four. Britton has demonstrated that it is NOT a Court

"An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government". Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F. Supp. 94

"When a judge acts where he or she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason." US v Will, 449 US 200, 216, 101 S Ct, 471, 66 LEd2d 392, 406 (1980) Cohens V Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5LEd 257 (1821);

and officers of the court are deemed to know the law

"Officers of the court have no immunity, when violating a constitutional right, for they are deemed to know the law." Owens v Independence 100 S.C.T. 1398 (Ezra

7:23-26)

Seventy-five. Britton has demonstrated that she intends to impersonate a Judge in her military court

“(a) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) impersonates a public servant with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely on his pretended official acts; or

(2) knowingly purports to exercise any function of a public servant or of a public office, including that of a judge and court, and the position or office through which he purports to exercise a function of a public servant or public office has no lawful existence under the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.” Texas Penal Code, Section 37.11. IMPERSONATING PUBLIC SERVANT, [emphasis added]

and Britton intends to conspire with Graham, Hurtado, Collingwood, Carter, Nilson, Echols, Kirsey, Jenny, and others, to intend to threaten, intimidate, injure and oppress the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant’s right to have consumer goods instead of business equipment in violation of their District of Columbia Codes

“If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ...They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; ...” 18 USC § 241 Conspiracy to Violate Rights under Color of Law [emphasis added]

and they each individually intend to subject the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant’s right to have consumer goods instead of business equipment

“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;”18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law [emphasis added]

because under the International Law that they love to assault people with consumer goods fail to be subject to taxation, and an automobile that is used for carrying passengers or property for hire is considered business equipment, and an automobile used for any other purpose is consumer goods as described herein.

Seventy-six. The Demandant witnessed that they are a gang of Privateers operating on the high seas of commerce under International Law

“privateer 1. A vessel owned and operated by private persons, but authorized by a nation on certain conditions to damage the commerce of the enemy by acts of piracy. 2. A sailor on such a vessel.” Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 3785 [emphasis added]

“privateering, International law. The practice of arming privately owned merchant ships for the purpose of attacking enemy trading ships. Before the practice was outlawed, governments commissioned privateers by issuing letters of marque to their merchant fleets. Privateering was prohibited by the Declaration of Paris Concerning Naval Warfare of 1856, which has been observed by nearly all nations since that time” Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 3785 [emphasis added]

because they are all US citizens from the District of Columbia

“We therefore decline to overrule the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall: We hold that the District of Columbia is not a state within Article 3 of the Constitution. In other words cases between citizens of the District and those of the states were not included of the catalogue of controversies over which the Congress could give jurisdiction to the federal courts by virtue of Article 3. In other words Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction over citizens of Washington, District of Columbia and through their plenary power nationally covers those citizens even when in one of the several states as though the district expands for the purpose of regulating its citizens wherever they go throughout the states in union” National Mutual Insurance Company of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Company, 337 U.S. 582, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1948)

operating under International Law

“INTERNATIONAL LAW RULE: Adopted for areas under Federal legislative jurisdiction” “Federalizes State civil law, including common law.--The rule serves to federalize not only the statutory but the common law of a State. ...STATE AND FEDERAL VENUE DISCUSSED: The civil laws effective in an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction are Federal law, notwithstanding their derivation from State laws, and a cause arising under such laws may be brought in or removed to a Federal district court under sections 24 or 28 of the former Judicial Code (now sections 1331 and 1441 of title 28, United States Code), giving jurisdiction to such courts of civil actions arising under the “* * *laws * * * of the United States” ...” Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States – Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States, Part II, A Text of the Law of Legislative Jurisdiction Submitted to the Attorney General and Transmitted to the President June 1957, page 158-165

“The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, as used in this title, includes:

(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. 18 USC § 7 Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States defined (edict under martial law)

“And it may embrace also the vehicles and persons engaged in carrying it on. It would be in the power of Congress to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon its courts, over the cars engaged in transporting passengers or merchandise from one State to another, and over the persons engaged in conducting them, and deny to the parties the trial by jury.” Propeller Genessee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh et al. 12 How. 443 (U.S. 1851)

“This power [of admiralty jurisdiction] is as extensive upon land as upon water. The Constitution makes no distinction in that respect. And if the admiralty jurisdiction, in matters of contract and tort which the courts of the United States may lawfully exercise on the high seas, can be extended to the lakes under the power to regulate commerce, it can with the same propriety and upon the same construction, be extended to contracts and torts on land when the commerce is between different States. “ Propeller Genessee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh et al. 12 How. 443 (U.S. 1851)

under the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966

“(1) SECURITY INTEREST.-The term 'security interest' means any interest in property acquired by contract for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation or indemnifying against loss or liability. A security interest exists at any time

“(3) MOTOR VEHICLE.-The term 'motor vehicle' means a self-propelled vehicle which is registered for highway use under the laws of any State or foreign country.

“(4) SECURITY.-The term 'security' means any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by a corporation or a government or political subdivision thereof, with interest coupons or in registered form, share of stock, voting trust certificate, or any certificate of interest or participation in, certificate of deposit or receipt for, temporary or interim certificate for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing: negotiable instrument: or money.” Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 at Public Law 89-719 at 80 Stat. 1130-1131

Seventy-seven. The Demandant witnessed that Lacey Britton Presiding Magistrate, Euless Municipal Court, engage in Official Oppression by assaulting the Demandant with her quasi-contract

“Assumpsit -In its origin an action of tort, [assumpsit] was soon transformed

into an action of contract, becoming afterwards a remedy where there was neither tort nor contract. Based at first only upon an express promise, it was afterwards supported upon an implied promise, and even upon a fictitious promise. Introduced as a special manifestation of the action on the case, it soon acquired the dignity of a distinct form of action, which superseded Debt, became concurrent with Account, with Case upon a bailment, a warranty, and bills of exchange, and competed with Equity in the case of the essentially equitable quasi-contracts growing out of the principle of unjust enrichment. Surely, it would be hard to find a better illustration of the flexibility and power of self-development of the Common Law.” James Barr Ames, “The History of Assumpsit,” in 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 298 (1909).” Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 379 [emphasis added]

“Both in Roman and English law there are certain obligations which were not in truth contractual, but which the law treats as IF they were. They are contractual in law, but not in fact, being the subject-matter of a fictitious extension of the sphere of contract to cover obligations which do not in reality fall within it.” Salmond, Salmond on Jurisprudence, p. 642 (9th Edition, 1937, Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. England). [emphasis added]

where they assault the Demandant with some of their so-called “benefits”

“It is a well settled rule of law that he who seeks benefits of contract must also assume burdens.” Higgins v. Monckton (1938), 28 C.A.2d 723, 83 P.2d 516

“Voluntary acceptance of benefit of transaction is equivalent to consent to all obligations arising from it, so far as facts are known, or ought to be known, to person accepting.” Northern Assurance Co. v. Stout (1911), 16 C.A. 548, 117 P. 617

“A quasi contractual action presupposes acceptance and retention of a benefit by one party with full appreciation of the facts, under circumstances making it inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment of its reasonable value.” Major-Blakeney Co. v. Jenkins (1953), 121 C.A.2d 325, 263 P.2d 655, hear den.; Townsend Pierson, Inc. v. Holly-Coleman Co. (1960), 178 C.A.2d 373, 2 Cal. Rptr. 812. [emphasis added]

which is why Britton and the Eulless Military Police are so adamant about coercing hearsay evidence from me, and from third parties, about your Roman Cult cestui que trust / government employee / Social Security Number

“Constructive/quasi contracts are based solely upon a legal fiction or fiction of law.” Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936.

Seventy-eight. The Demandant witnessed that Lacey Britton engaged in Official Oppression when she denied the Demandant due process by calling the Demandant a Defendant when she is required to know that a Defendant is somebody accused of a

crime, and a Class C Misdemeanor fails to be a crime, which also means that she had pre-judged the case, and it didn't matter what I said or did

“(5) Crime means (A) a misdemeanor punishable by confinement (jail); or (B) a felony

(6) “DEFENDANT” means a person accused of a crime” Texas Government Code § 79.001 Definitions (edict under the Roman Cult's martial law)

as evidenced by Brittons “Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order” when there was no probable cause for the stop and there was no crime in Euless or Lake Worth.

Seventy-nine. The Demandant witnessed that when Lacey Britton authorized the “Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order” she subjected the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's right to fail to appear for a civil matter, because a Class C Misdemeanor fails to be a crime, which is in violation of her 18 USC § 242 Violating Rights under Color of Law

Eighty. The Demandant witnessed that Lacey Britton engaged in Official Oppression when she denied the Demandant due process by criminally converting the Demandant's name into their Roman Cult cestui que trust FEARN, GLENN WINNINGHAM, which also means that she had pre-judged the case, and it didn't matter what the Demandant said or did

“Yet still it was found difficult to set bounds to ecclesiastical ingenuity; for when they were driven out of all their former holds, they devised a new method of conveyance, by which the lands were granted, not to themselves directly, but to nominal feoffees to the use of the religious houses; thus distinguishing between the possession and the use, and receiving the actual profits, while the seisin of the lands remained in the nominal feoffee, who was held by the courts of equity (then under the direction of the clergy) to be bound in conscience to account [taxes] to his cestui que use for the rents and emoluments of the estate: and it is to these inventions that our practitioners are indebted for the introduction of uses and trusts, the foundation of modern conveyancing.” Tomlins Law Dictionary, 1835 Edition, Volume 2 under the definition of Mortmain [emphasis added]

“Chap. 854. – An Act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia.” which was Approved on March 3, 1901, by the Fifty-Sixth Congress, Session II, at 31 Stat. 1189, and at 2, where it says;

“And be it further enacted, That in the interpretation and construction of said code the following rules shall be observed namely:...

“Third. The word “person” shall be held to apply to partnerships and corporations, ...”, [emphasis added]

“The Legal Estate to be in Cestui Que Use” Chapter Fifty-Six in Sec. 1617, at 31

Stat. 1432

and they even presume you are dead at Chapter three – Absence for Seven Years, in Sec. 252, at 31 Stat. 1230, where it says;

“SEC. 252. PRESUMPTION OF DEATH. - he shall be presumed to be dead, in any case wherein his death shall come in question, unless proof be made that he was alive within that time.,

“(2) the term “individual” means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;” 5 USC § 552a.(a)(2)

... (E)very taxpayer is a cestui qui trust having sufficient interest in the preventing abuse of the trust to be recognized in the field of this court's prerogative jurisdiction . . In Re Bolens (1912), 135 N.W. 164

A “*citizen of the United States*” is a civilly dead entity operating as a co-trustee and co-beneficiary of the *PCT (Public Charitable Trust)*, the constructive, *cestui que trust* of US Inc. under the 14th Amendment, which upholds the debt of the USA and US Inc. Congressional Record, June 13 1967, pp. 15641-15646

their Roman Cult cestui que trust FEARN, GLENN WINNINGHAM is codified here

“Corporation” “shall be deemed to include any company, trust, so-called Massachusetts trust, or association, incorporated or unincorporated, which is organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members, and has shares of capital or capital stock or certificates of interest, and any company, trust, so-called Massachusetts trust, or association, incorporated or unincorporated, without shares of capital or capital stock or certificates of interest, except partnerships, which is organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members.” 15 USC § 44 Definitions [emphasis added];

and as evidenced by their “Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order”, a true copy of which is attached hereto as part of the Police Report, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, and a US citizen has no rights

“...the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States do not necessarily include all the rights protected by the first eight amendments to the Federal constitution against the powers of the Federal government.” Maxwell v Dow, 20 S.C.R. 448, at pg 455

“The right of trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the 7th Amendment (Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90), and the right to bear arms, guaranteed by the 2nd Amendment (Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252), have been distinctly held not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against abridgement by the states, and in effect the same decision was made in respect of the guarantee against prosecution, except by indictment of a grand jury, contained in the 5th Amendment (Hurtado v.

California, 110 U. S. 516), and in respect of the right to be confronted with witnesses, contained in the 6th Amendment." West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258.

"The only absolute and unqualified right of a United States citizen is to residence within the territorial boundaries of the United States," US vs. Valentine 288 F. Supp. 957

and these Eulless Privateers are all US citizens operating exclusively in federal territory under their military dictatorship

"To eliminate all controversies of this character, and thus to come to the pivotal contentions which the case involves, let the Demandant state and concede the soundness of some principles, referring, in doing so, in the margin to the authorities by which they are sustained, and making such comment on some of them as may to the Demandant appear necessary.....

Fifth. The Constitution has undoubtedly conferred on Congress the right to create such municipal organizations as it may deem best for all the territories of the United States, whether they have been incorporated or not, to give to the inhabitants as respects the local governments such degree of representation as may be conducive to the public wellbeing, to deprive such territory of representative government if it is considered just to do so, and to change such local governments at discretion." Downes v Bidwell, 182 US 244

which is consistent with Texas codes because all Texas Statutes, Codes, Rules and Regulations are for subjects of the enemy (US citizens) under the Martial Law

"In this state" means within the exterior limits of Texas and includes all territory within these limits ceded to or owned by the United States." Texas Tax Code Section 151.004 'In This State' [emphasis added]

and the word "includes" is limiting

Montello Salt v. Utah 221 US 455 *"Include' or the participial form thereof, is defined 'to comprise within'; 'to hold'; 'to contain'; 'enclosed'; 'comprised'; 'comprehend'; 'embrace'; 'involve'."*

"Include 1. To confine within; to hold; to contain; as, the shell of a nut includes the kernel; a pearl is included in a shell. [But in these senses we more commonly use inclose.] 2. To comprise; to comprehend; to contain." American Dictionary of The English Language, Noah Webster, 1828

"Include. (Lat. Inclaudere, to shut in, keep within.) To confine within, hold as in an inclosure, take in, attain, shut up, contain, inclose, comprise, comprehend, embrace, involve. Premier Products Co. v. Cameron, 240 Or. 123, 400 P.2d 227, 228." Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition, page 763

which means that the phrase "In this State" is ONLY territory that is ceded to or owned by the United States

"In this state" means within the exterior limits of Texas and includes all territory within these limits ceded to or owned by the United States." Texas Tax Code Section 151.004 'In This State' [emphasis added]

which is consistent with the fact that Texas is under a military occupation, and all statutes, codes, rules and regulations are edicts under Martial Law, and which also ONLY apply to subjects and property of the federal government (US citizens – government employees)

"(a) This chapter applies to a motor vehicle owned by the state or a political subdivision of the state.

(b) This chapter does not apply to;

(3) a motor vehicle while it is owned or operated by the United States. (Postal Service or military vehicles)" Texas Transportation Code § 501.004. Applicability. (of Certificate of Title Act)

therefore, vehicle registration is ONLY required in federal areas of Texas for US citizens and government employees

"(a) The owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state:

(2) may not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle on a public highway until the owner obtains:

(A) title and registration for the vehicle; or

(B) a receipt evidencing title for registration purposes only under Section 501.029.

(b) A person may not operate a motor vehicle registered in this state on a public highway if the person knows or has reason to believe that the owner has not obtained a title for the vehicle.

(c) The owner of a motor vehicle that is required to be titled and registered in this state must obtain a title to the vehicle before selling or disposing of the vehicle.

(d) Subsection (c) does not apply to a motor vehicle operated on a public highway in this state with a metal dealer's license plate or a dealer's or buyer's temporary tag attached to the vehicle as provided by Chapter 503." Texas Transportation Code Section 501.022 Motor Vehicle Title Required [emphasis added]

a drivers license is ONLY required in federal areas of Texas for US citizens and government employees

"A person, other than a person expressly exempted under this chapter, may not operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person holds a driver's license issued under this chapter." Texas Transportation Code Sec. 521.021. License Required

evidence of financial responsibility is ONLY required in federal areas of Texas

“A person may not operate a motor vehicle in this state unless financial responsibility is established for that vehicle through:....”

Texas Transportation Code Sec. 601.051. Requirement of Financial Responsibility

motor vehicle inspections are ONLY required in federal areas of Texas

“(a) A motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, or mobile home, registered in this state, must have the following items inspected at an inspection station or by an inspector:” Texas Transportation Code Sec. 548.051. Vehicles and Equipment Subject to Inspection [emphasis added]

which is consistent with municipal courts operating in federal areas of Texas and such judges being US citizens

“(a) A municipal court of record is presided over by one or more municipal judges.

(b) The governing body shall by ordinance appoint its municipal judges.

(c) A municipal judge must:

(1) be a resident of this state;

(2) be a citizen of the United States;

(3) be a licensed attorney in good standing; and

(4) have two or more years of experience in the practice of law in this state.”

Texas Government Code Section 30.00006 JUDGE [emphasis added]

and all liars (Attorneys) and Judges and Courts are operating ONLY in federal areas of Texas

“(a) An assistant prosecuting attorney must be licensed to practice law in this state and shall take the constitutional oath of office.” Texas Government Code Section 41.103 Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys [emphasis added]

“To qualify for appointment as an associate judge under this subchapter, a person must:

(1) be a resident of this state and one of the counties the person will serve;

(2) have been licensed to practice law in this state for at least four years;”

Texas Government Code Section 54A.003 Qualifications [emphasis added]

“(a) The Board of Law Examiners, acting under instructions of the supreme court as provided by this chapter, shall determine the eligibility of candidates for examination for a license to practice law in this state.” Texas Government Code Section 82.004 Board Duties [emphasis added]

“(a) The Office of Court Administration of the Texas Judicial System shall develop and maintain a model for a uniform written jury summons in this state.” Texas Government code Section 62.0131 Form of Written Jury Summons [emphasis added]

and all Law Enforcement Agencies are enforcing the Martial Law ONLY in federal areas of Texas

“(a) In this article:

(1) “Law enforcement agency” means an agency of the state, or of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state, that employs peace officers who make motor vehicle stops in the routine performance of the officers’ official duties.

(2) “Motor vehicle stop” means an occasion in which a peace officer stops a motor vehicle for an alleged violation of a law or ordinance.

(3) “Race or ethnicity” means of a particular descent, including Caucasian, African, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, or Middle Eastern descent.

(b) Each law enforcement agency in this state shall adopt a detailed written policy on racial profiling...” Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.132 Law Enforcement Policy on Racial Profiling [emphasis added]

Eighty-one. The Demandant witnessed that Britton engaged in Official Oppression and conspiracy to threaten, intimidate, coerce, and oppressthe Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant’s right to fail to appear for a civil matter, with Graham, and others when she denied the Demandant due process when she pre-judged the Demandant’s case by authorizing the “Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order” when there was no probable cause of a crime, when the Demandant’s registration is none of their business, and to be an accomplice his denials of due process calling the Demandant a Defendant when she is required to know that a Defendant is somebody accused of a crime, and a Class C Misdemeanor fails to be a crime, and criminally converting the Demandant’s appellation into FEAR, GLENN WINNINGHAM, which also means that she had pre-judged the case, and it didn’t matter what the Demandant said or did, and it further demonstrated that she was NOT neutral or unbiased

“It is a fundamental right of a party to have a neutral and detached judge preside over the judicial proceedings.” Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62, 93 S.Ct 80, 83, 34 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1972); Tumey v Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 5209, 47 S. Ct. 437, 440, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)

but instead she demonstrated that she is a (bought and paid for) Clerk masquerading as a Judge,

When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts administrating or enforcing statutes do not act

judicially, but merely ministerially....but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved agency -- but only in a "ministerial" and not a "discretionary capacity Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464 [emphasis added]

"It is the accepted rule, not only in state courts, but, of the federal courts as well, that when a judge is enforcing administrative law they are described as mere 'extensions of the administrative agency for superior reviewing purposes' as a ministerial clerk for an agency..." 30 Cal 596; 167 Cal 762

"...judges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes (civil or criminal in nature and otherwise), act as mere "clerks" of the involved agency..." K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 (CTP. West's 1965 Ed.)

and Britton intends to assault the Demandant with her show-trial and kangaroo court

"Kangaroo court. Term descriptive of a sham legal proceeding in which a person's rights are totally disregarded and in which the result is a foregone conclusion because of the bias of the court or other tribunal." Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 868, [emphasis added]

and Britton knows that she is in bad behavior and therefore

"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." Constitution for the United States of America, Article 3, Section 1

"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted, or influenced, or influence is attempted, or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- i.e., where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted." Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985)

and she has walked away from any immunity she may have enjoyed

"Ministerial officers are incompetent to receive grants of judicial power from the legislature, their acts in attempting to exercise such powers are necessarily nullities" Burns v. Sup., Ct., SF, 140 Cal. 1

"Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has been the law from the days of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke 68; also Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 351." Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948

and everything she does is brutum fulmen

"brutum fulmen": "An empty noise; an empty threat. A judgment void upon its face which is in legal effect no judgment at all, and by which no rights are divested, and from which none can be obtained; and neither binds nor bars anyone. Dollert v. Pratt-Hewitt Oil Corporation, Tex.Civ.Appl, 179 S.W.2d 346, 348. Also, see Corpus Juris Secundum, "Judgments" §§ 499, 512 546, 549. Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition

and she knows that she has no authority over a man, which is why she has criminally converted the Demandant's appellation into their Roman Cult cestui que trust FEARN, GLENN WINNINGHAM, and has walked away from any immunity she may have had

"...where any state proceeds against a private individual in a judicial forum it is well settled that the state, county, municipality, etc. waives any immunity to counters, cross claims and complaints, by direct or collateral means regarding the matters involved." Luckenback v. The Thekla, 295 F 1020, 226 Us 328; Lyders v. Lund, 32 F2d 308

"Judge loses his absolute immunity from damage actions only when he acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction or performance of an act which is not judicial in nature." Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202

"In arriving at our decision in this matter we do not depart in any way from our holding in Huendling v. Jensen that the doctrine of judicial immunity extends to courts of limited jurisdiction. But, when a minor magistrate acts wholly without jurisdiction, civil liability attaches for his malicious and corrupt abuse of process and his willful and malicious oppression of any person under the pretense of acting in his official capacity. See Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d at 749 and authorities cited."188 N.W.2d 294; 1971 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 863; 64 A.L.R.3d 1242

all of which is evidenced by their "Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order", a true copy of which is attached the Police Report which is attached hereto, all of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

Eighty-two. The Demandant witnessed that Britton engaged in Official Oppression and participated in a conspiracy to threaten, coerce, oppress, and injure the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant's right to fail to give evidence against himself, and the Demandant's right to fail to appear for a civil matter, when she denied the Demandant due process by calling the Demandant a Defendant and criminally converting the Demandant's name, which also means that she had pre-judged the case, and it didn't matter what the Demandant said or did

"Whenever this title [the Uniform Commercial Code] creates a "presumption" with respect to a fact, or provides that a fact is "presumed," the trier of fact must find the existence of the fact unless and until evidence is introduced that

supports a finding of its nonexistence." UCC § 1-206 Presumptions [emphasis added]

and engaged in Official Oppression and conspiracy to threaten, coerce, oppress, and injure the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant's right to fail to give evidence against himself, and the Demandant's right to fail to appear for a civil matter, when she forged the Demandant's signature onto a quasi contract

"A quasi contractual action presupposes acceptance and retention of a benefit by one party with full appreciation of the facts, under circumstances making it inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment of its reasonable value." Major-Blakeney Co. v. Jenkins (1953), 121 C.A.2d 325, 263 P.2d 655, hear den.; Townsend Pierson, Inc. v. Holly-Coleman Co. (1960), 178 C.A.2d 373, 2 Cal. Rptr. 812. [emphasis added]

which ONLY applies to their Roman Cult cestui que trust

"Constructive/quasi contracts are based solely upon a legal fiction or fiction of law." Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936

under her satanic Uniform Commercial Code

"(a) In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument are admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings. If the validity of a signature is denied in the pleadings, the burden of establishing validity is on the person claiming validity, but the signature is presumed to be authentic and authorized" Uniform Commercial Code § 3-308 Proof of Signatures and Status as Holder in Due Course [emphasis added]

"The following rules apply in an action on a certificated security against the issuer:

(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on a security certificate or in a necessary indorsement is admitted.

(2) If the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue, the burden of establishing effectiveness is on the party claiming under the signature, but the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized." Uniform Commercial Code § 8-114 Evidentiary Rules Concerning Certificated Securities [emphasis added]

and she engaged in Official Oppression and conspiracy to threaten, coerce, oppress, and injure the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant's right to fail to give evidence against himself, and the Demandant's right to fail to appear for a civil matter, because she has demonstrated that she intends to sell the Demandant into slavery as surety for her Roman Cult cestui que trust

"But individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group, cannot be

said to be exercising their personal rights and duties, nor be entitled to their purely personal privileges. Rather they assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they are bound by its obligations." *Brasswell v. United States* 487 U.S. 99 (1988) quoting, *United States v. White* 322 U.S. 694 (1944),

"He [the prisoner] has as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity affords him. He is for the time being a slave of the state." 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871)

and this can ONLY happen under the current military dictatorship, because at common law she would get her neck stretched

"If a man be found stealing any of his brethren of the children of Israel, and maketh merchandise of him, or selleth him ; then that thief shall die; and thou shalt put evil away from among you." Deuteronomy 24:7

as evidenced by the fact that she issued the capias, which is a debt instrument

"CAPIAS AD SATISFACIENDUM (shortly termed a CA. SA.) A judicial writ of execution which issues out on the record of a Judgment, where there is a recovery in the courts..., of debt, damages, &c. And by this writ the sheriff is commanded to take the body of the defendant in execution, and him safely to keep, so that he have his body in court at the return of the writ, to satisfy the plaintiff his debt and damages. *Vide 1 Litt Abr. 249.*" Tomlins Law Dictionary, 1835 Edition, Volume 1 [emphasis added]

"In this chapter: (1) "Capias" means a writ that is: (A) issued by a court having jurisdiction of a case after judgment and sentence; and (B) directed "To any peace officer of the State of Texas" and commanding the officer to arrest a person convicted of an offense and bring the arrested person before that court immediately or on a day or at a term stated in the writ.

(2) "Capias pro fine" means a writ that is:

(A) issued by a court having jurisdiction of a case after judgment and sentence for unpaid fines and costs; and

(B) directed "To any peace officer of the State of Texas" and commanding the officer to arrest a person convicted of an offense and bring the arrested person before that court immediately." Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 43.015 Definitions

Eighty-three. The Demandant witnessed that Britton engage in Official Oppression and conspiracy to threaten, coerce, oppress, and injure the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant's right to fail to give evidence against himself, and the Demandant's right to fail to appear for a civil matter, when she denied the Demandant due process by assaulting the Demandant with her satanic religious ceremony

“(a)Whoever, in any of the circumstances referred to in subsection (b) of this section—

(2) intentionally obstructs, by force or threat of force, including by threat of force against religious real property, any person in the enjoyment of that person’s free exercise of religious beliefs, or attempts to do so; shall be punished as provided in subsection (d)

(b) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the offense is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 USC § 247 Damage to Religious Property; Obstruction of persons in the free exercise of religious beliefs

Eighty-four. The Demandant witnessed that presumptions by Britton and her privateer thugs is not a means of escaping constitutional restrictions

“The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.” Bailey v Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 238, et seq., 31 S.Ct. 145; Manley v Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 5-6, 49 S.Ct. 215

Eighty-five. The Demandant witnessed Britton together with her Euless Military Police Privateers conspire together to threaten, injure, oppress, and intimidate the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant’s right to fail to register the Demandant’s vehicle, or pay the tax associated with such registration, because “consumer goods” are not required to be registered, but they intend to threaten, injure, oppress, and intimidate the Demandant into converting the Demandant’s “consumer goods” vehicle into “business equipment” so then they can justify assaulting the Demandant with their quasi contract

“If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ...They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; ...” 18 USC § 241 Conspiracy to Violate Rights under Color of Law

and then they further denied due process and orchestrating a cover up by creating a capias,

“In this chapter: (1) “Capias” means a writ that is: (A) issued by a court having jurisdiction of a case after judgment and sentence; and (B) directed “To any peace officer of the State of Texas” and commanding the officer to arrest a person convicted of an offense and bring the arrested person before that court immediately or on a day or at a term stated in the writ.

(2) “Capias pro fine” means a writ that is:

(A) issued by a court having jurisdiction of a case after judgment and sentence for unpaid fines and costs; and

(B) directed “To any peace officer of the State of Texas” and commanding the officer to arrest a person convicted of an offense and bring the arrested person

before that court immediately.” Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 43.015 Definitions

when they had no jurisdiction, there was no trial, no conviction, no sentence, and they are required to know that a Warrant may NOT be issued for a Class C Misdemeanor, but it is all such good business for their so-called Courts and their extortion racket.

Eighty-six. The Demandant witnessed Britton together with her Euless Military Police Privateers threaten, injure, oppress, and intimidate the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant’s right to fail to register the Demandant’s vehicle, or pay the tax associated with such registration

“If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; ...They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; ...” 18 USC § 241 Conspiracy to Violate Rights under Color of Law

Eighty-seven. The Demandant witnessed Lacey Britton together with her Euless Military Police Privateers impersonate Public Servant

“(a) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) impersonates a public servant with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely on his pretended official acts; or

(2) knowingly purports to exercise any function of a public servant or of a public office, including that of a judge and court, and the position or office through which he purports to exercise a function of a public servant or public office has no lawful existence under the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.” Texas Penal Code, Section 37.11 Impersonating Public Servant, [emphasis added];

Eighty-eight. The Demandant witnessed that under the approval and consent and supervision of Lacey Britton, and in support of her Official Oppression, and conspiracy to threaten, coerce, oppress, and injure the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant’s right to fail to give evidence against himself, and the Demandant’s right to fail to appear for a civil matter, someone other than the County Attorney is representing the State of Texas in violation of Article 5, Section 21 of the Texas Constitution

“...The County Attorneys shall represent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties; Article 5, Section 21, Texas Constitution

but it is all such good business for their so-called Courts and their extortion racket, and

when they violate due process they lose subject matter jurisdiction, and are required to dismiss the case, but that wouldn't help their extortion racket either

"If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h)(3);

Eighty-nine. The Demandant witnessed that the Euless Military Police Chief intends to fail to properly train their military troops because they intend that their military subordinates engage in multiple felonies in support of their dictatorship agenda and get away with it by claiming "good faith";

Ninety. The Demandant served on Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney with the rank of General a Notice and Demand by Registered Mail RE 332 991 089 US which was received by him on 17 April 2019, as evidenced by a true copy of which that is attached hereto, together with proof of service, all of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety, because as the Texas Attorney with the rank of General, Ken Paxton is the highest law enforcement Officer in Texas enforcing the Martial Law and all Law Enforcement Officers are his subordinates, and are operating under his directions and with his approval, and he is responsible for their actions, as evidenced in paragraph 11 that says;

"Ken Paxton, the private man acting as Texas Attorney with the rank of General, you are NOTICED that as an Attorney with the rank of General, you are an officer of the military occupation in Texas, and as the highest Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) in Texas, all Law Enforcement Officers in Texas are under your command, and your subordinates, and you are responsible for their actions."

Ninety-one. The Demandant witnessed that Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney with the rank of General is an accomplice to the Official Oppression of these Colleyville Military Police as evidenced in Paragraph 65 that says;

**"You, Ken Paxton, the private man acting as Texas Attorney with the rank of General, subordinates and successors, et al, as the highest Law Enforcement Officer in Texas, are NOTICED that pursuant to your edicts under Martial Law, a Class "C" misdemeanors does not impose any legal disability
....and your edicts under Martial Law say the penalty can be a fine ONLY
.....and your edicts under Martial Law say an arrest warrant may NOT be issued, therefore, there is no such thing as a warrant for a Class "C" Misdemeanor
.....and your edicts under Martial Law say a failure to appear is also a fine ONLY
.....and pursuant to your edicts under Martial Law your Municipal Courts may ONLY hear cases that are misdemeanors punishable by jail, or felonies
.....and a "DEFENDANT" is ONLY accused of a crime**

.....and your edicts under Martial Law say the Certificate of Title ONLY applies to motor vehicles that are owned by the state or a political subdivision of the state
.....because the Certificate of Title certifies that the state has the Title, which means the vehicle is owned by the state, and your edicts under Martial Law say no political subdivision may require the Demandant to register the Demandant's property

.....therefore the registration of the Demandant's vehicle is none of your business, and it is none of the business of any of your subordinates, which is proof that any action involving a private automobile that is considered "consumer goods" or "household goods" as described herein, is a malicious prosecution

.....and since they may NOT issue a warrant, they do issue a capias, as described herein, which is NOT a warrant, but is a debt instrument and if you or your subordinates arrest the Demandant for anything involving a Class "C" misdemeanor, it shall be evidence that you and your subordinates intend to act in your private capacity as third party debt collectors in support of an extortion racket."

and paragraph 69 that says;

You, Ken Paxton, the private man acting as Texas Attorney with the rank of General, subordinates and successors, et al, as the highest Law Enforcement Officer in Texas, are NOTICED that in the event that there is any interaction between you and your subordinates and me, that fails to involve a breach of the peace, or a lawful court order, it shall be evidence that you and your subordinate intend to cease to represent the government

.....and pursuant to your edicts under Martial Law, it shall be evidence that you and your subordinates intend to impersonate a public servant

.....and pursuant to your edicts under Martial Law, it shall be evidence that you intend that any action that may be brought is simulating a legal process

.....all of which is in furtherance of their quasi contract

.....which is why you and your subordinates are so adamant about coercing information from me, and from third parties, about your Roman Cult cestui que trust / government employee / Social Security Number

.....because they create a fraudulent fictitious debt and issue a capias pursuant to your edicts under Martial Law

.....and pursuant to your edicts under Martial Law, you and your subordinates can have an excuse to assault (unlawfully arrest) me, kidnap the Demandant and falsely imprison the Demandant and claim "good faith" and call it a warrant

.....when they know that a capias is NOT an arrest warrant

.....which is also what precipitated the War of Independence

.....especially since Samuel Adams coined the phrase "give the Demandant Liberty or give the Demandant death" after witnessing a man flogged to death for refusing to take a license

.....for their extortion racket to get Federal Reserve Notes which are meant for internal use of the government ONLY, and for US citizens ONLY pursuant to your edicts under Martial Law"

and Ken Paxton and his subordinates were notified by this Notice and Demand and they fail to have "good faith" as evidenced in Paragraph 73, and were put into estoppel as evidenced in Paragraph 74, which is further evidence that their Official Oppression, and their Impersonating Public Servants, and their Simulated Legal Process, and their subjecting the Demandant to the deprivation of the Demandant's rights under the color of law, and their conspiracy to threaten, intimidate, oppress and injure the Demandant in the free exercise of the Demandant's rights, is deliberate, calculated and malicious.

Ninety-two. The Demandant witnessed that The Demandant has previously filed lawsuits (several) with the federal so-called courts and John McBryde always seems to get them and then proceeded to dismiss them because the Demandant failed to pay for McBryde's license fee (filing fee),

"License, contracts, is a right given by some competent authority to do an act, which without such authority would be illegal. The instrument or writing which secures this right is also called a license. Vide Ayl.Parerg. 353; 15 Vin.Ab 92; Ang. Wat. Co. 61, 85. A license is express or implied. An express license is one in which in direct terms authorizes the performance of a certain act; as a license to keep a tavern by public authority. An implied license is one which though not expressly given, may be presumed from the acts of the party having the right to give it." Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1843 Edition, Volume 2, page 53 [emphasis added]

thereby demonstrating that McBryde intended to be a (bought and paid for) Clerk masquerading as a Judge / revenue officer converting the Demandant's right to file a lawsuit into a privilege

"The claim and exercise of a Constitutional (guaranteed) right cannot be converted into a crime". Miller v US, 230 Fed 486,489

"No State shall convert a liberty into a privilege, license it, and charge a fee therefore." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights." Sherer v. Cullen, 481 F 946

"If the State converts a right (liberty) into a privilege, the citizen can ignore the license and fee and engage in the right (liberty) with impunity." Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham Alabama, 373 US 262

Ninety-three. The Demandant has filed several felony criminal complaints with Erin Nealy Cox and she refused to prosecute them, therefore she intends to be an accomplice to these felons described herein,

Ninety-four. The Demandant filed several criminal complaints with Sharen Wilson and she refuses to prosecute them, therefore she intends to be an accomplice to the felonies described herein,

Ninety-five. The Demandant witnessed that wrongdoers trespass upon the Demandant's property;

Ninety-six. The Demandant witnessed that the causal agent of the trespass is false arrest, assault, kidnapping, false imprisonment, breach of trust, perjury, seditious conspiracy, treason, theft of property, Official Oppression, War Crimes, Deprivation of Immunities under Color of Law, Conspiracy to do all of the above, and more;

Ninety-seven. the trespass did and does cause harm and injury to the Demandant's property;

Summary

Ninety-eight. Wrongdoers Brown Chief of military police , BAR member Britton, together with the Mayor and City Council, deliberately, and calculatedly screen for, and hire low intelligence thugs who have a propensity for aggressive behavior and give the thugs guns and tell the thugs to go out and engage in false arrest and false imprisonment, especially targeting people like me, because they know their thugs can claim "good faith" and get away with it,

- a. as part of their agenda to take reprisals against people like the Demandant for political beliefs, and religious beliefs,
- b. as part of their slavery agenda,
- c. as part of their agenda to pillage property,
- d. as part of their agenda to coerce information from the Demandant and anyone else,
- e. as part of their agenda to terrorize the Demandant and anyone else,
- f. as part of their agenda to engage in malicious prosecutions,
- g. as part of their agenda to force feed you dead pig and other poisons with the objective of population reduction for their Roman Cult handlers
- h. as part of their agenda to deny the Demandant and anyone like the Demandant due process, in support of their War Crimes and military dictatorship

Ninety-nine. These wrongdoers named herein are making war on the Demandant in violation of the Definitive Treaty of Peace of 1783, Article 7 that says;

“There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between his Britannic Majesty and the said states, and between the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other,.....”

as agents for Queen Elizabeth, II, who is Arch Treasurer and Prince Elector of the United States of America, as successor to the tyrant King George;

One hundred. These wrongdoers named herein are assaulting the Demandant with their Roman Cult handler's cestui que trust GLENN WINNINGHAM FEARNS, and the Roman Cult's International Law

“INTERNATIONAL LAW RULE: Adopted for areas under Federal legislative jurisdiction” “Federalizes State civil law, including common law.--The rule serves to federalize not only the statutory but the common law of a State. ...STATE AND FEDERAL VENUE DISCUSSED: The civil laws effective in an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction are Federal law, notwithstanding their derivation from State laws, and a cause arising under such laws may be brought in or removed to a Federal district court under sections 24 or 28 of the former Judicial Code (now sections 1331 and 1441 of title 28, United States Code), giving jurisdiction to such courts of civil actions arising under the “* * * laws * * * of the United States” ...” Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States – Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States, Part II, A Text of the Law of Legislative Jurisdiction Submitted to the Attorney General and Transmitted to the President June 1957, page 158-165

“We therefore decline to overrule the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall: We hold that the District of Columbia is not a state within Article 3 of the Constitution. In other words cases between citizens of the District and those of the states were not included of the catalogue of controversies over which the Congress could give jurisdiction to the federal courts by virtue of Article 3. In other words Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction over citizens of Washington District of Columbia and through their plenary power nationally covers those citizens even when in one of the several states as though the district expands for the purpose of regulating its citizens wherever they go throughout the states in union” National Mutual Insurance Company of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Company, 337 U.S. 582, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1948)

“The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized nations acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage” Lieber Code, Article 27 [emphasis added]

by using their Roman Cult martial law to convert the Demandant into their “subject of the enemy”

“Martial Law extends to property, and to persons, whether they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.” Lieber Code, Article 7

“All subjects over which the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of taxation, but those over which it does not extend are exempt from taxation. This proposition may also be pronounced as self-evident. The sovereignty of the state extends to everything which exists by its authority or its permission.” McCullough v Maryland, 17 U.S. [4 Wheat] 316 (1819). [emphasis added]

which is a seditious conspiracy

“If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.” 18 USC § 2384,

and treason to the constitution

“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.” Cohen v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264

“But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the people of the United States and their Government, and interfering with their relation to each other. The powers of the Government, and the rights of the citizens under it, are positive and practical regulations plainly written down. The people of the United States have delegated to it certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to exercise others.” Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How (60 U.S.) 393, 452, 15 L.Ed. 691 (A.D. 1856-1857) [emphasis added]

“The power that is derived cannot be greater than that from which it is derived” *Derativa potestas non potest esse major primitiva*. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1856 Edition

and they are using the treaty power of their unconstitutional bankrupt municipal corporation

“but Madison insisted that just “because this power is given to Congress,” it did not follow that the Treaty Power was “absolute and unlimited.” The President and the Senate lacked the power “to dismember the empire,” for example, because “[t]he exercise of the power must be consistent with the object of the

delegation.” **“The object of treaties,” in Madison’s oft-repeated formulation, “is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and is external.”** Bond v United States 572 US ____ (2014) case number 12-158 [emphasis added]

“Today, it is enough to highlight some of the structural and historical evidence suggesting that the Treaty Power can be used to arrange intercourse with other nations, but not to regulate purely domestic affairs.” Bond v United States 572 US ____ (2014) case number 12-158 [emphasis added]

“The government of the United States . . . is one of limited powers. It can exercise authority over no subjects, except those which have been delegated to it. Congress cannot, by legislation, enlarge the federal jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the treaty-making power” Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 736 [emphasis added],

which is also what they did to precipitate the War of Independence, which is where their true agenda lies, to make war as part of their seditious conspiracy and all of the other crimes described herein;

One hundred one. These wrongdoers named herein have engaged in a seditious conspiracy to assault the Demandant with their International Law, which includes their International Law Rule, and the Law of War, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in a Time of War of 1949

“The compacts which have temporary matters for their object are called agreements, conventions, and pactions. They are accomplished by one single act, and not by repeated acts. These compacts are perfected in their execution once for all: treaties receive a successive execution whose duration equals that of the treaty.” Vattel, Law of Nations, §153. Pactions, agreements, or conventions.

and the perjurers have failed to honor their own international agreements

“It is a settled point in natural law, that he who has made a promise to any one, has conferred upon him a real right to require the thing promised, and consequently, that the breach of a perfect promise is a violation of another person’s right, and as evidently an act of injustice, as it would be to rob a man of his property. The tranquillity, the happiness, the security of the human race, wholly depend on justice, on the obligation of paying a regard to the rights of others....” The Law of Nations, by Vattel, §163. Obligation of observing treaties. [emphasis added]

and it is injustice, that these Roman Cult satanists have demonstrated that they are real good at

“As the engagements of a treaty impose on the one hand a perfect obligation, they produce on the other a perfect right. The breach of a treaty is therefore a violation of the perfect right of the party with whom we have contracted; and this

is an act of injustice against him.” The Law of Nations, by Vattel, §164. The violation of a treaty is an act of injustice. [emphasis added]

and they have violated their own Law of Nations;

“He who violates his treaties, violates at the same time the law of nations; for he disregards the faith of treaties, that faith which the law of nations declares sacred; and, so far as depends on him, he renders it vain and ineffectual. Doubly guilty, he does an injury to his ally, he does an injury to all nations, and inflicts a wound on the great society of mankind. “On the observance and execution of treaties,” said a respectable sovereign, “depends all the security which princes and states have with respect to each other: and no dependence could henceforward be placed in future conventions, if the existing ones were not to be observed.”The Law of Nations, by Vattel, §221. He who violates his treaties, violates the law of nations. [emphasis added];

One hundred two. The Demandant already knows that it doesn't matter what the Demandant says, or does, because this case was pre-judged from the beginning, and this case will get dismissed by the (bought and paid for) Clerk masquerading as a Judge / Military Commissioner / BAR member / whore selling their “Justus”

“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.” John 8:44

But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers [pharmaceutical drug pushers], and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone: which is the second death.” Revelations 21:8

and we were all here before this universe was created and we will all be here when it goes away, and before God, Angels and anyone who reads this as a witness, the Demandant shake the dust of the earth from off the Demandant's feet against you (Matt 10:14, Mark 6:11, Luke 9:5) and we will be talking about this on judgment day!!!!;

One hundred three. in any event, the rights protected in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in a Time of War of 1949 may not be given up

“Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention,” Article 8, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilians in a Time of War of 1949

and their criminal corporations are responsible, even if they let their gustapo thugs off the hook

“The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may be incurred.” Article 29, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilians in a Time of War of 1949;

One hundred four. i hold no personal animosity towards these Eulless military police because they may have not been trained properly, and we do need officers to keep the peace, and Graham, and may be victims because it is well known that military police chiefs screen out applicants, looking for certain types of personalities with low intelligence, and then give them quotas for revenue (there are Youtube videos of Peace Officers who were FIRED for failing to make quotas) and in the event that they demonstrate that they have truly repented, then as a Christian, The Demandant is required to forgive them, but the Roman Cult's BAR members are presumed to know the law

“Officers of the court have no immunity, when violating a constitutional right, for they are deemed to know the law.” Owens v Independence 100 S.C.T. 1398 (Ezra 7:23-26)

therefore, Britton, McBryde, Paxton, and the coward Eulless prosecutor, and any other BAR members involved, are much more culpable in this matter, especially since they have clearly demonstrated that they have no problem engaging in felony mail fraud, and other felonies like official oppression, and conspiracy, and others described herein, all at the urging of the city Councils for revenue, in support of their extortion racket and criminal street gang;

One hundred five. i always prefer lawful money pursuant to the Coinage Act of 1792, but as an extremely less desirable alternative, i can accept their military script / fake money / IOUs / negotiable instruments / Federal Reserve Notes, and i would ask the (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge for extra compensation for accepting the liability associated with their fake money and to cover the Demandant's expenses associated with converting it to something real, like gold or silver coin, or land, etc;

One hundred six. i require compensation for the trespass upon the Demandant's property, and the Demandant has no problem with arbitration, but i shall sign no contracts because i would NOT want the (bought and paid for) Clerk masquerading as a Judge / Military Commissioners to think the Demandant has agreed to some contract

"and because it brings into action, and enforces this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that fellow citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each other in their own courts to have their controversies determined." Chisolm v Georgia 2 Dall. 440, [Emphasis added];

One hundred seven. compensation due from CITY OF EULESS, INC., for the extortion required to get the Demandant's private conveyance back after they engaged in criminal trespass and burglary of the Demandant's vehicle, and maliciously had it towed, (\$258.10) two hundred fifty eight dollars and ten cents;

One hundred eight. compensation due from Graham; his bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred nine. compensation due from Hurtado; his bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred ten. compensation due from Brown; his bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred eleven. compensation due from Britton; her bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred twelve. compensation due from Collingwood; his bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the

Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred thirteen. compensation due from Echols-Kirksey; his bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred fourteen. compensation due from Nilson; his bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred fifteen. compensation due from McBryde; his bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred sixteen. compensation due from the coward Euless prosecutor; Stacy White, her bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred seventeen. compensation due from Erin Nealy Cox; her bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred eighteen. compensation due from Ken Paxton; his bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and

punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred nineteen. compensation due from CITY OF EULESS, INC.; its bond (insurance), not a penny less and not a penny more and other relief for damages (exemplary and punitive) and relief for other damages to other property to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred twenty. the Roman Cult cestui que trust GLENN WINNINGHAM FEARNS should pay exemplary and punitive damages (because otherwise it would be unjust enrichment for the Roman Cult) to be decided by the jury or the Roman Cult (bought and paid for) clerk masquerading as a Judge / military commissioner / BAR member / BAAL priest;

One hundred twenty-one. since this is such a malicious prosecution, and these privateers are screened for low intelligence and a propensity for aggressive behavior, and Graham's supervisor Hurtado is in on it and so is their (bought and paid for) Clerk masquerading as a Judge (Magistrate), and they refused to get the County Sheriff, the Demandant is requesting actual damages in the amount seventy-five thousand dollars for each fifteen minute period as found in Trezevant v. City of Tampa, 741 F. 2d 336 in which an award of twenty-five thousand dollars was made in 1984 in actual damages for unlawful arrest, for approximately each 15 minutes period and i was held captive from about 830pm on Friday evening until about 530am Sunday morning, which is 32 hours which is \$9,600,000 (nine million six hundred thousand dollars) in actual damages, and exemplary damages Cleopatra Haslip et al. v Pacific Mutual Life Insurance, Inc. 499 U.S. 1, 113 Fed 2d 1, 111 sct 1032 (no. 89-1279) (For Conversion: 4 times for compensatory damages), and punitive damages of 200 times actual damages,

One hundred twenty-two. additional compensation due from each of the wrongdoers, a hand written letter of apology from each of them to me, and a letter of reprimand inserted into their permanent file, from each of the Euless military police, their military commissioner, and their prosecutor, their Euless Chief of military Police, and McBryde, Paxton,

One hundred twenty-three. another way of measuring any fake money / military script / compensation could be their District of Columbia codes (edicts under Martial Law), 18 USC § 1091 - \$1,000,000 per offense, 18 USC § 3571 - \$250,000 for each individual felony offense, \$500,000 for each felony offense by their criminal corporations, and other amounts for other offenses as found in 18 USC § 3571;

One hundred twenty-four. in the event that Graham, Hurtado, Brown and Collingwood, Echols-Kirksey and Nilson, demonstrate that they have truly repented, the Demandant is prepared to forgive them of all sins, and waive all requirements for their bonds, and any other damages that may be assessed on their behalf, except that the value of their bonds and other damages should then be provided by the Roman Cult's cestui que trust GLENN WINNINGHAM FEARN (because otherwise it would be unjust enrichment for the Roman Cult) but their associated corporations and the officers and BAR members thereof, remain fully responsible, and i still require hand written letters of apology from all involved. One way that they can demonstrate that they have truly repented is to join and become involved with Sheriff Richard Mack's Constitutional Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association, which is linked here; <https://cspoa.org/>;

One hundred twenty-five. the Demandant says here, that all herein be true;

One hundred twenty-six. signed and sealed in red ink on the soil of Texas, under penalties with perjury, [28 USC § 1746(1)], pursuant to locus sigilli, and Rule 201 of your Rules of Evidence

“locus sigilli - The place of the seal. Today this phrase is almost always abbreviated “L.S.” ” Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition, page 1026;

One hundred twenty-seven. further Demandant sayeth not;

One hundred twenty-eight. it has been said, so it is done.

One hundred twenty-nine. signed and sealed this day in December, in the year, Two
Thousand and Nineteen.

9 December 2019
Date

[Signature] L.S.
i, a man

With a proper mailing address [18 USC § 1342] of:

[glenn winningham; house of fearn ©]

General Post Office, ZIP Code EXEMPT

In care of; 6340 Lake Worth Boulevard, #437

Fort Worth, Texas [RR 76135]

Non-Domestic Mail, Without the United States, Inc.

JURAT


Texas

)
)
)
Subscribed, Affirmed, Sealed

Tarrant County

As a Notary Public, I hereby certify that glenn winningham; house of fearn, who is known to me, appeared before me and after affirming, he executed the foregoing document on this the 9th day of December, in the year two thousand and Nineteen.

[Signature: Nova Dean Parks]
Notary Public



EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Page 1

1102 W. Euless Blvd.

Inmate Booking Report

11/22/2019

Personal

Name: Fearn, Glenn Winningham

Agency Id: 248632-1

Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic

DOB [REDACTED]

Age: 62

POB: AZ

Race: White

Sex: Male

Weight: 220

Height: 5' 8"

Hair: Gray

Eyes: Brown



DL No.: [REDACTED]

Issued: AZ

SS No.: [REDACTED]

DPS No.:

FBI No.: AXLR5HPA1

Occupation:

Employer:

Address

Street: 6340 Lake Worth Boulevard 437

City: Fort Worth

State: TX

Zip: 76040

Phone

Phone:

Type:

Arrest

Arrest Agency: Euless Police Department

Booking Date: 11/22/2019 21:01

Arrest Officer: Graham, T #629

Booking Officer: Nilson, V #577

Arrest Location: 2200 Gateway Blvd

Arrest Date: 11/22/2019 8:45:00 PM

Vehicle

Make: Toyota

Model: Corolla

License No.: NONE

Towed: Yes

Remarks:

TX

Towed By

Charges

Call No.:

1 - Euless PD FAIL TO ID FUGITIVE FRM JUSTICE REFUSE TO GIVE MB Bond 500.00

1900065251

Remarks:

2 - Euless PD Cit#4098295-1 FMFR Bond 282.00

1900065251

Remarks:

3 - Euless PD Cit#4098295-2 Registration (No Plate) Bond 132.00

1900065251

Remarks:

4 - Lake Worth PD Wrnt#LPD-1066097 No Insurance Fine/Bond 655.10

1900065251

Remarks:

5 - Lake Worth PD Wrnt#LPD-1055096 DL-Fail To Display Fine/Bond 336.60

1900065251

Remarks:

60

mly

I, OFFICER GRAHAM, the reviewing officer of this police report do hereby swear and affirm that the above listed facts and circumstance(s) are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief

Date of
Arrestment

Tina G # 629
Officer

11/22/19

Date

Bonds:

\$

\$

\$

\$

PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION

Sufficient facts have been presented to me, under oath by affidavit, sworn testimony, or otherwise to show that probable cause exists for the continued detention of the prisoner identified as GLENN FEARN

as to the following charges:

FAIL TO ID FUGITIVE, FMR, NO PLATS, OTHER AGENCY WANTS

Signed this _____ day of _____, 20____.

MAGISTRATE

EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Narrative

Date of report: 2019-11-23

Case Number: 1900065251

Incident Number :1900065251

On 11/22/19 at 2032 hours I, Officer Graham (629), was patrolling in the area of 2200 Gateway Blvd in marked unit 1019. While patrolling in this area Graham came into contact with a silver in color Toyota corolla displaying a Texas Republic private property placard which is not a state issued license plate. Graham activated his emergency overhead lights to conduct a vehicle traffic stop and the above stated vehicle pulled over to the shoulder of the roadway. Graham made contact with the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle and tried to explain the reason for the stop but the driver was on the phone with Euless Police Dispatch demanding that they send a county sheriff deputy to this location. The unidentified driver continued to request for a county sheriff deputy, but was told by EPD Dispatch to talk to the Euless Officer on scene. Graham explained the reason for the stop to the unidentified driver, who became verbally combative and stated to Graham that he was not required to have a state LP on his vehicle. The unidentified driver started reading off a laminated paper accusing Graham of official oppression and reading of his version of the Texas penal code on why he was not required to have a LP on his vehicle. Graham contacted the on duty supervisor Sgt Hurtado (357) via radio and requested that he make Graham's scene. Graham asked the unidentified driver for his drivers license and insurance to which he responded " I don't have them and am not required to have them". The unidentified driver continued to read off of his laminated paper and was verbally combative towards Graham and at one point informed Graham that he had been to the supreme court five times and asked Graham if he wanted to be next. Graham again asked for the unidentified driver to provide identifying information and the driver continued to not provide it and informed Graham that he was " Going to sue his butt off".

Sgt Hurtado and Ofc Collingwood (626) arrived on scene and Graham had the unidentified driver step out of his vehicle and to the rear of the vehicle. Graham patted the driver down for weapons and asked him to sit on the curve, which he refused to do and continued to be verbally combative towards officers. Graham informed Sgt Hurtado for the reason for the stop and what all had transpired after making contact with the unidentified driver. Sgt Hurtado tried to reason with the driver and explain to him what would happen if he did not comply with the officers request of identifying information. The driver continued to be verbally aggressive with Officers and refused to comply with the above stated request. Due to the unidentified driver

Officer: Graham,T

ID#: 629

Approving Supervisor: Not approved

ID#:

EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Narrative

Date of report: 2019-11-23

Case Number: 1900065251

refusing to give identifying information for Graham to issue him citations for the traffic offenses, Graham placed the driver into handcuffs behind the back (double-locked), searched him incident to arrest, and placed him into the backseat of marked unit 1019. Collingwood requested a wrecker from B&B Wrecker service and did a vehicle inventory sheet on the vehicle. Graham transported the unidentified driver to the Euless Jail for booking on the following:

- 1.) Euless PD Cit#4098295-1- FMFR
- 2.) Euless PD Cit#4098295-2- Registration (No Plate)

While out at the Euless Jail the unidentified driver still refused to give any identifying information the booking officers and had to be finger printed so that Officers could obtain the necessary information. The results of the fingerprints came back and identified the driver as Glenn Fearn W/M 9/4/57 holding AZDL#D01474189. Graham ran Fearn's information through Euless Police Dispatch which came back with possible warrants out of Lake Worth PD with the identifiers being name, AZDL#, and address. Graham had EPD Dispatch confirm the warrants using the above stated identifiers and a short time later EPD Dispatch came back as the warrants being confirmed. Due to this new information of Fearn having active warrants and refusing to identify himself to law enforcement officers, Graham added the following charges:

- 3.) Euless PD- Fail To ID Fugitive FRM Justice Refuse To Give
- 4.) Lake Worth PD Wrnt#LPD-1066097- FMFR
- 5.) Lake Worth PD Wrnt#LPD-1055096- DL- Fail To Display

Dashcam: 1019

Bodycam: Graham 629, Sgt Hurtado 357, Collingwood 626

Officer: Graham, T
Approving Supervisor: Not approved

ID#: 629
ID#:

EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Narrative

Date of report: 2019-11-23

Case Number: 1900065251

DME: N/A

Officer: Graham,T

ID#: 629

Approving Supervisor: Not approved

ID#:

Page 3

64

EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT VEHICLE INVENTORY REPORT

No 42839

AR NUMBER 19-65251 NATURE OF PULL ARREST
 DATE/TIME 11/22/19 2045 LOCATION 2200 GATEWAY BLVD
 PERSON ARRESTED UNKNOWN R/S W/M DOB UNKNOWN
 VEHICLE DESCRIPTION: YEAR 2015 MAKE TOYOTA MODEL COROLA COLOR SILVER
REPUBLIC OF TEXAS
 MILEAGE _____ DAMAGE MINOR PAINT & BODY

*****INVENTORY OF PROPERTY*****

FRONT SEAT AREA MISC. PERSONAL ITEMS

REAR SEAT AREA DUFFEL BAG, MISC. PAPERWORK

TRUNK/BED/TRAILER GAS CAN

YES OR NO RADIO YES KEYS NO RADAR DETECTOR NO JACK YES CARPET YES
 HUB CAPS YES MOBILE PHONE NO SPARE TIRE YES ALARM NO

REMARKS _____

THIS VEHICLE MAY BE RELEASED BY EULESS WRECKER SERVICE WITHOUT A RELEASE FORM FROM THE EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT. YES ✓ NO _____

MJR CH 620
 OFFICER SIGNATURE ID#

Aaron Ch
 WRECKER DRIVER SIGNATURE

*****RELEASE INFORMATION*****

I, _____, the undersigned do hereby certify that I am the owner of the above described vehicle or an authorized agent of the owner and the above described vehicle was released to me on this the _____ day of _____, 20____.

NAME _____ ADDRESS _____
 PHONE _____ DL # AND STATE _____

Signature Person Receiving Vehicle

Signature of Releasing Officer

ID #

*****VEHICLE RELEASE*****

No 42839

THE EULESS WRECKER SERVICE IS AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE THE BELOW DESCRIBED VEHICLE TO THE PERSON LISTED BELOW OR HIS AUTHORIZED AGENT.

NAME _____
 YEAR _____ MAKE _____ MODEL _____ LICENSE _____
 LICENSE STATE _____ VIN _____

65
 Signature of Releasing Officer

ID #

State of Texas
 V.
Fearn, Glenn Winningham

§
 §
 §

In The Municipal Court
 City of Euless
 Tarrant County, Texas

PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION AND COMMITMENT ORDER

**IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
 TO THE SHERIFF OF TARRANT COUNTY:**

Sufficient facts have been presented to me under oath by affidavit, sworn testimony, or otherwise, to show that probable cause exists for the continued detention of the above-named accused as to the following charge(s):

Offense Charged	Agency & Warrant No./On View
1. Fail to ID Fugative Frm Justice Refuse to Give	Euless Police Department (New Case)
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	

You are hereby ORDERED to take into custody and safely keep the above-named accused in your jail and hold him/her in your jail to be held to answer to the assigned court of jurisdiction.

Signed this 23 day of November, 2019

Signature: _____

Larry D. Britten

Printed Name: L. Britten

Magistrate for: Euless /, Texas

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EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Page 1

Inmate Release Report

Receipt Number:

Call Number 248632

11/23/2019

Arrestee Fearn, Glenn Winningham

Agency ID: 248632

Inmate No 1

Rel. Officer Carter, R #387

Rel. Date 11/23/2019 1:18:00 PM Authority See Remarks

Remarks: charge 1.4-5- rel to tarrant co so yandell
charge 2-3 refused to sign pr bond and all other paperwork

Total Due: 0

67

EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Page 1

1102 W. Euless Blvd.

Inmate Booking Report

11/23/2019

Personal

Name: Fearn, Glenn Winningham

Agency Id: 248632-1

Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic

DOB: [REDACTED]

Age: 62

POB: AZ

Race: White

Sex: Male

Weight: 220

Height: 5' 8"

Hair: Gray

Eyes: Brown



DL No.: [REDACTED]

Issued: AZ

SS No.: [REDACTED]

DPS No.:

FBI No.: AXLR5HPA1

Occupation:

Employer:

Address

Street: 6340 Lake Worth Boulevard 437

City: Fort Worth

State: TX

Zip: 76040

Phone

Phone:

Type:

Arrest

Arrest Agency: Euless Police Department

Booking Date: 11/22/2019 21:01

Arrest Officer: Graham, T #629

Booking Officer: Nilson, V #577

Arrest Location: 2200 Gateway Blvd

Arrest Date: 11/22/2019 8:45:00 PM

Vehicle

Make: Toyota

Model: Corolla

License No.: NONE

Towed: Yes

Remarks:

9292018256

TX

Towed By

686517

Charges

1 - Euless PD FAIL TO ID FUGITIVE FRM JUSTICE REFUSE TO GIVE MB Bond 500.00

Call No.:
1900065251

Remarks:

2 - Euless PD Cit#4098295-1 FMFR Bond 282.00

1900065251

Remarks:

3 - Euless PD Cit#4098295-2 Registration (No Plate) Bond 132.00

1900065251

Remarks:

4 - Lake Worth PD Wrnt#LPD-1066097 No Insurance Fine/Bond 655.10

1900065251

Remarks:

5 - Lake Worth PD Wrnt#LPD-1055096 DL-Fail To Display Fine/Bond 336.60

1900065251

Remarks:

68

BOOK-IN INFORMATION SHEET

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE ARRESTING OFFICER PRIOR TO BOOK-IN

ARRESTING OFFICER'S ID # 629 AR# 19-00065251

SUSPECTS NAME: GLENN FEARN (M)/F

DOB: [REDACTED] AGE: 62 (DL#)/ID# [REDACTED] STATE AZ

LOCATION OF ARREST 2200 GATEWAY BLVD

DATE/TIME OF ARREST 11/22/19

SPECIAL INFORMATION N/A

STRIP SEARCH REQUESTED YES (NO)
(CIRCLE ONE)

SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZING STRIP SEARCH N/A

VEHICLE INFORMATION
IMPOUNDED (YES)/NO

YEAR 2015

MAKE TOYOTA

MODEL COROLLA

COLOR SILVER

LP#, STATE, YR NONE

CHARGES	CITATION NUMBER	CLASS
<u>FMRP</u>	<u>4098295-1</u>	<u>C</u>
<u>NO PLATE</u>	<u>4098295-2</u>	<u>C</u>
<u>FAIL TO ID FUGITIVE</u>		<u>B</u>

Inmate Partner Violence Level 2 3 4

INCLUDE APPLICABLE CITATION NUMBERS IN CHARGE AREA. IF NECESSARY, ADD ADDITIONAL CHARGES/INFORMATION ON THE BACK.

Questions asked of inmate by Arresting/Transporting Officer.

1. Have you ever been diagnosed as having a mental illness by a doctor or by a mental health provider? ☐ Yes ☒ No
2. Have you ever or are currently taking any medications for mental illness? ☐ Yes ☒ No
3. Have you ever tried to kill yourself? ☐ Yes ☒ No
4. Do you currently have thoughts of killing yourself? ☐ Yes ☒ No

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EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Page 1

Medical QuestionnaireCRIMES
Police Research Center
Sam Houston State UniversityInmate Name: **Feam, Glenn Winningham**
Agency ID: **248632-1**

Print Date: 11/22/2019 9:28:52 PM

Social Security Number:

Height: **68** Weight: **220** Hair: **Gray** Eyes: **Brown** Race: **White** Sex: **Male**

1. Are you or do you think you are pregnant? **NO**
2. Do you have any medical/dental problems that need attention now? **NO**
3. Do you have any of these symptoms? **NO**
Cough, weakness, weight loss, fevers, night sweats or appetite loss?
4. Are you taking or suppose to be taking any prescribed medications? **NO**
5. Is there any evidence of recent physical injury? **NO**
6. Does the patient display inappropriate behavior? **NO**
7. Insurance:
8. Do you feel you could be a victim of any type of assault while in custody? **NO**

Comments and Remarks

Refused to answer

9. Have you ever been treated for :

Asthma	NO	Drug Addiction	NO	STD	NO
Heart Trouble	NO	Alcoholism	NO	Tuberculosis	NO
High Blood Pressure	NO	Mental Illness	NO	HIV Test (Neg.)	NO
Diabetes	NO	Allergies	NO	HIV Test (Pos.)	NO
seizures	NO	Hepatitis	NO		

Treatment RemarksHave you ever been diagnosed as having a mental illness by a doctor or by a mental health provider? **N**Have you ever or are you currently taking any medications for mental illness? **N**Have you ever tried to kill yourself? **N**Do you currently have thoughts of killing yourself? **N**Referred To Infirmery **NO** Psychiatric **NO** Security **NO**

Inmate Signature

refused

Processor's Signature

V. M. L. 577 / AK039

Date and Time

11

EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT**Property Receipt**

Page 1
 CRIMES
 Police Research Center
 Sam Houston State University
 Print Date: 11/22/2019

Inmate Name: **Fearn, Glenn Winningham**
 Agency ID: **248632-1**

Check In Receipt #: 0
 Check In Date: 11/22/2019 9:29:02 PM

Booked Property


Item #	Item	Quantity	Locker	Checked In By
1	Shoes	2	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
2	Misc Cards/Papers	SOME	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
3	Visa	3	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
4	Mastercard	1	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
5	Silver Coins	2	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
6	Money	126.0	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
Remarks 577/639				
7	Jacket/Coat	1	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
8	Belt	1	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
9	Keys	SET	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
10	Socks/Stockings	2	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
11	Watch	1	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
12	Wallet	1	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
13	Loose Change	SOME	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63
14	Pen/Pencil	1	38	Echols-Kirksey, A #63

Inmate Signature refused

Processor's Signature V. N. Loran 577/AR1039/

Inmate Signature (Released Property) refused 1039-7

Secondary signature 72



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

PRECEDENCE

☐ Immediate

☐ Priority

☒ Routine

CLASSIFICATION

☐ Top Secret

☐ Secret

☐ Confidential

☐ Sensitive

☒ Unclassified

TO

Name of Office:

POLICE DEPARTMENT

Facsimile Number:

8178354848

Date:

11/22/2019

Attn:

PSO V NILSON

Room:

Telephone Number:

FROM

Name of Office:

FBI SPECIAL PROCESSING CENTER

Number of Pages: (including cover)

Originator's Telephone Number:

304-625-5584

Originator's Facsimile Number:

304-625-5587

Approved:

WGM/JENNY

DETAILS

Subject:

RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST

Special Handling Instructions:

PAGES FOLLOWING THIS COVER SHEET CONTAIN PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION .

Brief Description of Communication Faxed:

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
CLARKSBURG, WV

Date: 11/22/2019



TO: POLICE DEPARTMENT

ATTN: PSO V NILSON

FROM: FBI - CJIS DIVISION
SPECIAL PROCESSING CENTER
BTC
1000 CUSTER HOLLOW ROAD CLARKSBURG,
WV 26306

PHONE: 304-625-5584 (24 HOUR - VOICE)
304-625-5587 (24 HOUR - AUTO FAX)

EMAIL: spc@leo.gov

SUBJECT: FEARN, GLENN WINNINGHAM

YOUR CASE #:

DATE PRINTS SUBMITTED: 11/22/2019

The fingerprints you submitted on the above subject have been identified with FBI/UCN# AXLR5HPA1

NAME: FEARN, GLENN WINNINGHAM

DOB: 9/4/1957

COMMENTS:

This subject's criminal history is available in and must be obtained through the
NCIC Interstate Identification Index (III).

AUTHORIZATION: WGM/JEN

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE

This transmission may contain confidential information belonging to the sender which is protected by law. The information is intended only for the user of the recipient named above. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any actions in reliance on the contents of this transmission is strictly prohibited.

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* * * Communication Result Report (Nov. 22. 2019 9:36PM) * * *

1}
2}

Date/Time: Nov. 22. 2019 9:30PM

File No. Mode	Destination	Pg(s)	Result	Page Not Sent
2451 Memory TX	FBI Fingerprint	P. 6	OK	

Reason for error

E. 1) Hang up or line fail
E. 3) No answer
E. 5) Exceeded max. E-mail size

E. 2) Busy
E. 4) No facsimile connection
E. 6) Destination does not support IP-Fax

EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT



FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: 11/22/2019

PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 6

ATTENTION: Fingerprint Div

AGENCY: FBI

PHONE/FAX: 3048255587

FROM: PSO V. Nilson 577

DIVISION: Eulless PD

PHONE/FAX: 817-685-1577/817-835-4848

Eulless Police Non-Emergency
Numbers

Dispatch:	817-685-1626
Dispatch Fax:	817-685-1572
Jail:	817-685-1577
Jail Fax:	817-835-4848
Patrol:	817-685-1659
CID:	817-685-1631
Community Relations:	817-685-1634
Property:	817-685-1641
Internal Affairs:	817-685-1655

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Please help identify:

Glenn Winningham Fearn. Refusing to answer any questions, only has a Republic of Texas Diplomatic Official Identification card and refused to give DOB.

Thank you,
PSO, V. Nilson #577

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EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT



FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: 11/22/2019

PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 6

ATTENTION: Fingerprint Div

AGENCY: FBI

PHONE/FAX: 3046255587

FROM: PSO V. Nilson 577

DIVISION: Euless PD

PHONE/FAX: 817-685-1577/817-835-4848

Euless Police Non-Emergency Numbers

Dispatch:	817-685-1526
Dispatch Fax:	817-685-1572
Jail:	817-685-1577
Jail Fax:	817-835-4848
Patrol:	817-685-1550
CID:	817-685-1531
Community Relations:	817-685-1536
Property:	817-685-1541
Internal Affairs:	817-685-1555

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Please help identify:

Glenn Winningham Fearn. Refusing to answer any questions, only has a Republic of Texas Diplomatic Official Identification card and refused to give DOB.

Thank you,
PSO. V. Nilson #577

76



FD-448
Revised
10-27-2004

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

PRECEDENCE



Immediate



Priority



Routine

CLASSIFICATION



Top Secret



Secret



Confidential



Sensitive



Unclassified

TO

Name of Office:

POLICE DEPARTMENT

Facsimile Number:

8178354848

Date:

11/22/2019

Attn:

PSO V NILSON

Room:

Telephone Number:

FROM

Name of Office:

FBI SPECIAL PROCESSING CENTER

Number of Pages: (including cover)

Originator's Telephone
Number:

304-625-5584

Originator's Facsimile Number:

304-625-5587

Approved:

WGM/JENNY

DETAILS

Subject:

RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST

Special Handling Instructions:

PAGES FOLLOWING THIS COVER SHEET CONTAIN PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION .

Brief Description of Communication Faxed:

WARNING

Information attached to the cover sheet is U.S. Government Property. If you are not the intended recipient of this information disclosure, reproduction, distribution, or use of this information is prohibited (18.U.S.C. 641). Please notify the originator or local FBI Office immediately to arrange for proper disposition.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION
CLARKSBURG, WV

Date: 11/22/2019



TO: POLICE DEPARTMENT

ATTN: PSO V NILSON

FROM: FBI - CJIS DIVISION
SPECIAL PROCESSING CENTER
BTC
1000 CUSTER HOLLOW ROAD CLARKSBURG,
WV 26306

PHONE: 304-625-5584 (24 HOUR - VOICE)
304-625-5587 (24 HOUR - AUTO FAX)

EMAIL: spc@leo.gov

SUBJECT: FEARN, GLENN WINNINGHAM

YOUR CASE #:

DATE PRINTS SUBMITTED: 11/22/2019

The fingerprints you submitted on the above subject have been identified with FBI/UCN# AXLR5HPA1

NAME: FEARN, GLENN WINNINGHAM

DOB: 9/4/1957

COMMENTS:

This subject's criminal history is available in and must be obtained through the
NCIC Interstate Identification Index (III).

AUTHORIZATION: WGM/JEN

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE

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14

* * * Communication Result Report (Nov. 22. 2019 9:36PM) * * *

11
21

Date/Time: Nov. 22. 2019 9:30PM

File No. Mode	Destination	Pg(s)	Result	Page Not Sent
2451 Memory TX	FBI Fingerprint	P. 6	OK	

Reason for error
 1) Hang up or line fail
 2) No answer
 3) Exceeded max. E-mail size

4) Busy
 5) No facsimile connection
 6) Destination does not support IP-Fax

EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT



FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: 11/22/2019PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 8ATTENTION: Fingerprint DivAGENCY: FBIPHONE/FAX: 3046255587FROM: PSO V. Nilson 577DIVISION: Euless PDPHONE/FAX: 817-685-1577/817-835-4848

Euless Police Non-Emergency Numbers	
Dispatch:	817-685-1528
Dispatch Fax:	817-685-1672
Jail:	817-685-1577
Jail Fax:	817-835-4848
Patrol:	817-685-1530
CD:	817-685-1531
Community Relations:	817-685-1538
Property:	817-685-1541
Internal Affairs:	817-685-1685

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Please help identify:

Glenn Winningham Fearn. Refusing to answer any questions, only has a Republic of Texas Diplomatic Official Identification card and refused to give DOB.

Thank you,PSO V. Nilson #577

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EULESS POLICE DEPARTMENT



FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: 11/22/2019

PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 6

ATTENTION: Fingerprint Div

AGENCY: FBI

PHONE/FAX: 3046255587

FROM: PSO V. Nilson 577

DIVISION: Euless PD

PHONE/FAX: 817-685-1577/817-835-4848

Euless Police Non-Emergency Numbers

Dispatch:	817-685-1526
Dispatch Fax:	817-685-1572
Jail:	817-685-1577
Jail Fax:	817-835-4848
Patrol:	817-685-1550
CID:	817-685-1531
Community Relations:	817-685-1536
Property:	817-685-1541
Internal Affairs:	817-685-1555

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Please help identify:

Glenn Winningham Fearn. Refusing to answer any questions, only has a Republic of Texas Diplomatic Official Identification card and refused to give DOB.

Thank you,

PSO. V. Nilson #577

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OATH

"I, TIMOTHY C. GRAHAM DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I WILL FAITHFULLY EXECUTE THE DUTIES OF A POLICE OFFICER OF THE CITY OF EULESS, TARRANT COUNTY, STATE OF TEXAS, AND WILL TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY PRESERVE, PROTECT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THIS STATE AND THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF EULESS; AND I FURTHER SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I HAVE NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PAID, OFFERED, OR PROMISED TO PAY CONTRIBUTED, NOR PROMISED TO CONTRIBUTE ANY MONEY, OR VALUABLE THING, OR PROMISED ANY PUBLIC OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT, AS A REWARD FOR THE APPOINTMENT TO THIS OFFICE, SO HELP ME GOD."

SIGNED: Timothy Graham

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME, THIS 27TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, A.D. 2018.

M. G. B...

TITLE: CHIEF OF POLICE



Texas Commission On Law Enforcement

6330 E. HIGHWAY 290, STE 200, AUSTIN, Texas 78723
(512) 936-7700

9/27/2018

EULESS POLICE DEPT.
1102 W EULESS BLVD
EULESS, TX 76040

To Department Administrator:

Based upon the application submitted by the EULESS POLICE DEPT., TIMOTHY C. GRAHAM is hereby issued the following:

TYPE

Peace Officer License
TIMOTHY C. GRAHAM

P ID ISSUE DATE
470133 09/27/2018

This acknowledgement is to be maintained in the personnel file of TIMOTHY C. GRAHAM and made available for inspection by Commission personnel upon request.

Chief Kim Vickers
Executive Director

Good luck on your law enforcement career in Texas. Please give us a call whenever we may be of assistance.



Laminating the front of your card with Dual Laminate:

1 Fold and peel back front of card at top corner



2 Turn card over and place front of card face down into clear panel



3 Push card back through clear panel, breaking through perforation



Texas Commission On Law Enforcement

Personal Status Report

Name TIMOTHY C. GRAHAM	TCOLE ID (P ID) 470133	STATUS
----------------------------------	----------------------------------	---------------

Citizen Yes	Race White	Gender Male	Federal ID	State ID
-----------------------	----------------------	-----------------------	-------------------	-----------------

Education Information

Institution	Hours	Education
	0	GED
Total Hours	0	
Total Training Hours	0	

Service History

Appointed As	Department	Award	Service Start Date	Service End Date	Service Time
Peace Officer (Full Time)	EULESS POLICE DEPT.	Peace Officer License	9/27/2018		1 years, 2 months

Total Service Time

Description	Service Time
Peace Officer	1 years, 2 months
Total officer time	1 years, 2 months

Award Information

Award	Type	Action	Action Date
Peace Officer License	License	Granted	9/27/2018

Courses Completed

09/01/2019 - 08/31/2021

Course No.	Course Title	Course Date	Course Hours	Institution	Training Mandates
2055	Firearms	9/18/2019	2	Euless Police Department	
		Unit Hours	2		

8/3




OATH

"I, EDGAR HURTADO DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I WILL FAITHFULLY EXECUTE THE DUTIES OF A POLICE SERGEANT OF THE CITY OF EULESS, TARRANT COUNTY, STATE OF TEXAS, AND WILL TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY PRESERVE, PROTECT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THIS STATE AND THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF EULESS; AND I FURTHER SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I HAVE NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PAID, OFFERED, OR PROMISED TO PAY CONTRIBUTED, NOR PROMISED TO CONTRIBUTE ANY MONEY, OR VALUABLE THING, OR PROMISED ANY PUBLIC OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT, AS A REWARD FOR THE APPOINTMENT TO THIS OFFICE, SO HELP ME GOD."

SIGNED:  357

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME, THIS 7TH DAY OF DECEMBER, A.D. 2017.




TITLE: CHIEF OF POLICE



TEXAS
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICER STANDARDS AND EDUCATION
6330 U.S. HIGHWAY 290 EAST, SUITE 200 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78723
PHONE 512-450-0188

February 11, 1999
Eules Police Dept.
205 N. Ector Dr.
Eules Tx. 76039



To Department Administrator:

Based upon the application submitted by Eules Police Dept., Edgar L. Hurtado is hereby issued the following,

TYPE

Peace Officer License

Edgar L. Hurtado

ISSUE DATE

02/11/1999



This acknowledgment is to be maintained in the personnel file of Edgar L. Hurtado and made available for inspection by Commission personnel upon request.

D. C. Jim Dozier, J.D., Ph.D.
Executive Director

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Texas Commission On Law Enforcement

Personal Status Report

Name EDGAR L. HURTADO	TCOLE ID (P ID) 246600	STATUS
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Citizen Yes	Race Hispanic	Gender Male	Federal ID N/A	 
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Education Information

Institution	Hours	Education
	119	Bachelor
	0	College Credits
Total Hours	119	
Total Training Hours	2380	

Service History

Appointed As	Department	Award	Service Start Date	Service End Date	Service Time
Peace Officer	EULESS POLICE DEPT.	Peace Officer License	2/1/1999		20 years, 10 months

Total Service Time

Description	Service Time
Peace Officer	20 years, 10 months
Total officer time	20 years, 10 months

Award Information

Award	Type	Action	Action Date
Peace Officer License	License		
		Granted	2/11/1999
Basic Peace Officer	Certificate		
		Certification Issued	8/1/2001
Intermediate Peace Officer	Certificate		
		Certification Issued	8/2/2001
Advanced Peace Officer	Certificate		
		Certification Issued	2/4/2004
Master Peace Officer	Certificate		
		Certification Issued	1/15/2008

Academy History

Completed	Date	Institution	Course Title
	1/15/1999	North Central Texas Reg. Academy	Basic Peace Officer
12/3/2019			

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THE CITY OF
EULESS

OATH

"I, MICHAEL R. COLLINGWOOD DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I WILL FAITHFULLY EXECUTE THE DUTIES OF A POLICE OFFICER OF THE CITY OF EULESS, TARRANT COUNTY, STATE OF TEXAS, AND WILL TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY PRESERVE, PROTECT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THIS STATE AND THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF EULESS; AND I FURTHER SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I HAVE NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PAID, OFFERED, OR PROMISED TO PAY CONTRIBUTED, NOR PROMISED TO CONTRIBUTE ANY MONEY, OR VALUABLE THING, OR PROMISED ANY PUBLIC OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT, AS A REWARD FOR THE APPOINTMENT TO THIS OFFICE, SO HELP ME GOD."

SIGNED: Michael R. Collingwood

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME, THIS 18th DAY OF May, A.D. 2018.

M. G. [Signature]
TITLE: Chief of Police



Texas Commission On Law Enforcement

6330 E. HIGHWAY 290, STE 200, AUSTIN, Texas 78723
(512) 936-7700

5/21/2018

EULESS POLICE DEPT.
1102 W EULESS BLVD
EULESS, TX 76040

To Department Administrator:

Based upon the application submitted by the EULESS POLICE DEPT., MICHAEL R. COLLINGWOOD is hereby issued the following:

TYPE

Peace Officer License

MICHAEL R. COLLINGWOOD

P ID ISSUE DATE

466392 05/18/2018

This acknowledgement is to be maintained in the personnel file of MICHAEL R. COLLINGWOOD and made available for inspection by Commission personnel upon request.

Chief Kim Vickers
Executive Director

Good luck on your law enforcement career in Texas. Please give us a call whenever we may be of assistance.



Laminating the front of your card with Dual Laminate:

1 Fold and peel back front of card at top corner



2 Turn card over and place front of card face down into clear panel



3 Push card back through clear panel, breaking through perforation



Texas Commission On Law Enforcement

Personal Status Report

Name MICHAEL R. COLLINGWOOD	TCOLE ID (P ID) 466392	STATUS
---------------------------------------	----------------------------------	---------------

Citizen Yes	Race White	Gender Male	Federal ID	State ID
-----------------------	----------------------	-----------------------	-------------------	-----------------

Education Information

Institution	Hours	Education
	0	High School
Total Hours	0	
Total Training Hours	0	

Service History

Appointed As	Department	Award	Service Start Date	Service End Date	Service Time
Peace Officer (Full Time)	EULESS POLICE DEPT.	Peace Officer License	5/18/2018		1 years, 7 months

Total Service Time

Description	Service Time
Peace Officer	1 years, 7 months
Total officer time	1 years, 7 months

Award Information

Award	Type	Action	Action Date
Peace Officer License	License	Granted	5/18/2018

Academy History

Completed	Date	Institution	Course Title
	4/26/2018	North Central Texas Reg. Academy	Basic Peace Officer Course (643)

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Office of the Secretary of State

Certificate of Fact

The undersigned, as Secretary of State of Texas, hereby certifies that a diligent search of the records of this office was performed on the name THE STATE OF TEXAS. It is further certified that the search revealed the following:

- There is no record of a domestic corporation, professional corporation, professional association, limited partnership, limited liability partnership, or limited liability company by the name searched.
- There is no record of a foreign corporation, professional corporation, professional association, limited partnership, limited liability partnership, limited liability company, business trust, real estate investment trust, or other foreign filing entity with a registration to transact business by the name searched.
- There is no record of an out-of-state financial institution registration by the name searched.
- There is no record to indicate that a designation of agent for service of process is on file for a Texas financial institution, unincorporated nonprofit association, or a defense base development authority by the name searched.

However, the following entities with names similar to the name searched were found.

STATE OF TEXAS- assumed name for Deer Park Cash Cow, LLC file number 801340241

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto signed my name officially and caused to be impressed hereon the Seal of State at my office in Austin, Texas on September 18, 2018.



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Pablos".

Rolando B. Pablos
Secretary of State

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Guerrero".

